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Abstract. This article is a critical engagement with the work of Axel Honneth and his significance for 
contemporary Critical Theory, social explanation, and emancipatory politics. I begin by exploring Honneth’s 
sympathies for, and criticisms of, both first generation critical theory and Jürgen Habermas’s emphasis on 
communicative action. I then consider Honneth’s turn to Hegel ’s early work on recognition and his emphasis 
on the underlying forms of mutual recognition, along with the accompanying forms of self-relation/real- 
is ation, disrespect and the potential for moral development and resistance. I explore these alongside Hon-
neth’s ‘formal conception of ethical life’ which he hopes can successfully mediate between formal Kantian 
morality and substantive communitarian ethics whilst also providing him with both a philosophical jus-
tification for his normative position and a standard of moral development for evaluating forms of, and 
struggles for, recognition. I also briefly outline his recent work on reification and recognition before then 
considering a number of critical responses to Honneth’s project as a whole. Whilst sympathetic to his focus on 
recognition, my criticisms of his work emphasise his tendency to idealise the notion of recognition, his lack of 
a sufficient conception of misrecognition, the ideological role that recognition often plays, and ultimately the 
abstract and procedural nature of his ‘formal’ conception of ethical life.
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Axel Honneth has been increasingly recog-
nised as an important figure in contemporary 
Critical Theory and in contemporary social 
theory as a whole. His work has been at the 
forefront of what has often been termed a 
‘third generation’ of Frankfurt School Critical 
Theory, and it has developed the ‘tradition’ in 
a number of new and interesting ways.1 In a 
similar vein to Jürgen Habermas, his work 
covers a broad number of areas and disciplines 
1 For a brief overview of the ‘third generation’ see Anderson (2011; 44–48).
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including moral theory, social philosophy, 
philosophical anthropology, politics, sociol-
ogy, and psychoanalysis. It has also attracted 
a growing number of followers and critics, 
and there is a rapidly growing secondary 
literature developing around his ideas.2 This 
article explores the ways in which Honneth 
continues the ‘critical theory’ project, how he 
addresses a number of criticisms directed at 
Habermas’s communicative project, and how 
his work both continues – and differs from – 
these developments. Honneth’s own trajectory 
has developed in a number of ways, although 
there are clear continuities between his early 
essays on Karl Marx, his work on philosophical 
anthropology, his exploration of different ver-
sions of critical theory in his Critique of Power 
(1991), through to his more recent essays on 
psychoanalysis, reification, and individual- 
isation and capitalism. However, the heart of 
his project – and still his most significant work 
to date – is his Struggle for Recognition (1996). 
I will begin by exploring the ways in which 
Honneth frames the original critical theory 
project, before outlining his sympathies for 
(and criticisms of ) the development of critical 
theory in Habermas’s communicative turn. 
I will then briefly outline the key points of 
Honneth’s ‘recognitive turn’ in critical theory 
before developing a number of criticisms of 
his project.3
The ‘Critical Theory’ project
In his essay ‘The Social Dynamics of 
Disrespect’ (in Honneth 2007; 63–79), Axel 
Honneth provides an overview of his posi-
tion in relation to earlier Critical Theory and 
Habermas. He outlines his commitment to a 
Left-Hegelian model of critique and explores 
the alternative possibilities for renewing Critical 
Theory along with their shortcomings. Despite 
Honneth’s criticisms of the original Frankfurt 
School project, he remains committed to a 
‘critical theory of society’ which he refers to as:
that type of social thought that shares a par-
ticular form of normative critique with the 
Frankfurt School’s original program – indeed, 
perhaps, with the whole tradition of Left Hegel- 
ianism – which can also inform us about the 
pre-theoretical resource in which its own criti-
cal viewpoint is anchored extratheoretically as 
an empirical interest or moral experience. (2007; 
63–64)
The ‘unrenounceable premise’ of Criti- 
cal Theory demands that any (materialist) 
theory of society that attempts a critique of 
contemporary social relations must be able to 
identify a social source for its critique within 
contemporary social reality – it must be able to 
identify what Honneth refers to as a moment 
of ‘intramundane transcendence’.4 Such a pro-
gramme is identifiable in the work of Karl Marx 
and Georg Lukács but is made most explicit in 
2 For example, see Van Den Brink and Owen (2007), Deranty (2009), Huttunen (2009), and 
Petherbridge (2011).
3 An extended version of my argument here appears in Hazeldine (2015).
4 Honneth pursues these ideas further in his ‘A Social Pathology of Reason: On the Intellectual 
Legacy of Critical Theory’ and ‘Reconstructive Social Criticism with a Genealogical Proviso: On 
the Idea of ‘Critique’ in the Frankfurt School’ in Honneth (2009).
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Max Horkheimer’s ‘Traditional and Critical 
Theory’ essay of 1937 (in Horkheimer 1999), 
where he emphasises the need for a ‘critical’ 
theory to be able to account for its own origins 
in social reality (its ‘pre-theoretical experience’) 
whilst also reflecting on its role in future social 
change. Critical Theory is not therefore simply 
a philosophical pursuit, but requires a sociolog- 
ical account of its own emergence – one which 
justifies its own emancipatory claims through 
recourse to a theory of society that is able to iden-
tify the emancipatory impulse at work in current 
social forces and, in turn, encourage us to resist 
domination. One of the difficulties with such 
a project is its ability to comprehend its own 
history and social context without succumbing 
to a relativist position that would compromise 
its ‘critical’ normative and political intentions.5
At first the answer for Horkheimer seemed 
to lie in making explicit what had been implicit 
in his criticisms and theoretical allegiances so 
far. By adhering to the classical Marxist theory 
of history, Horkheimer suggested that the 
developments in the forces of production had 
unleashed certain social relations, and a form 
of reason, able to critically outline the self-
knowledge of society – this would therefore 
explain the historical and social determination 
of Critical Theory along with its practical role 
(Horkheimer 1999).6 If reason and progress are 
apparent in history through the development 
of the productive forces, and become manifest 
through social conflict in the relations of pro-
duction, the key issue becomes identifying the 
processes at work that hinder the development 
of reason and progress through social conflict, 
and therefore the possibility of the ‘rational’ 
organisation of society that meets the needs 
of all, i.e. the processes at work in advanced 
capitalism hindering (or rather integrating) the 
consciousness of the working class.
According to the criticisms made from the 
‘communicative’ position of Habermas and 
Honneth, the development of earlier Critical 
5 Horkheimer’s division between ‘traditional’ theory and ‘critical’ theory is also a response to what he 
saw as the increasing separation between the empirical sciences and philosophical thought (Hork-
heimer 1999). The empirical sciences increasingly concerned themselves with discovering ‘facts’ 
divorced from philosophical self-reflection, and philosophical thought concerned itself with specu-
lative thinking about ‘essence’ divorced from any relationship to the empirical world. This division 
not only had consequences for forms of social criticism that sought to compare the world as it is 
with the world as it ‘ought’ to be, but also gave rise to the increasing acceptance of the empirical 
sciences, and their ‘facts’, as producing ‘true’ knowledge and representing the whole of reason.
6 Horkheimer also turned to Marx in an attempt to expose the flaws in the conflation of the 
empirical sciences with ‘objectivity’, and sought to demonstrate the importance of social labour 
and its connection to the ‘interestedness’ of positivist science. He argued that the subsumption 
of facts under conceptual knowledge in scientific theory mirrors the requirements of the control 
of nature in societal labour, and therefore that societal labour provides the practical context (or 
pre-theoretical resource) for the empirical sciences. Those theories which neglect the social and 
practical determination and emergence of their own origins, and see themselves as ‘pure’ theory, 
are examples of what Horkheimer calls ‘traditional theory’. Whereas the empirical sciences could 
be appealed to as authoritative knowledge in the mastery of nature, critical theory could be ap-
pealed to as authoritative knowledge in the self-reflection of a society.
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Theory was ultimately unable to satisfy its 
own criteria (Honneth 1991, 1995; Habermas 
1984, 1992). Given the historical context 
within which the Frankfurt School were writ-
ing – Stalinism, Fascism, and the decline of 
proletarian revolutionary activity – the ‘inner 
circle’ of the Frankfurt School (Friedrich Pol-
lock, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Herbert 
Marcuse) set about trying to understand the 
inability of the proletariat to realise their ‘real’ 
interests (Honneth 1995).7 Horkheimer’s orig- 
inal project had sought to supplement the levels 
of political economy and psychology with the 
study of culture, due to the need to explain the 
cultural conditions for the integration of the 
individual – in this case mass culture – rather 
than assume a direct relationship between socio-
economic demands and individual conformity. 
In an attempt to avoid a crude functionalist 
connection between economic demands and 
psychological developments, Horkheimer orig- 
inally, according to Honneth, sought to investi-
gate ‘those “moral customs” and “life-styles” in 
which the everyday communicative practice of 
social groups finds expression’ (Honneth 1995; 
69). However, Honneth argues that a function-
alist conception of culture followed instead 
whereby, in the form of a base-superstructure 
model, culture played the role of further inte-
grating individuals into wider socio-economic 
demands, and it increasingly lost its critical 
function and assumed an administrative role 
in the name of economic efficiency.8
Honneth seeks to confront what he sees as a 
functionalist reductionism apparent in the inner 
circle of Critical Theory, and lays the blame at 
the door of their philosophical-historical pre-
suppositions (Honneth 1995; 70). In a consis-
tently Habermasian manner, Honneth outlines 
what he sees as the two key premises shared by 
Horkheimer and Adorno (and Marcuse) in their 
philosophy of history: (i) the emphasis on ‘the 
philosophy of consciousness which construes 
human rationality according to the model of 
the cognitive relation of a subject to an object’, 
whereby human rationality is ‘understood as the 
intellectual faculty for the instrumental disposal 
over natural objects’; and (ii) that ‘historical 
development takes place above all as a process of 
unfolding precisely that potential for rationality 
which is articulated in the instrumental disposal 
of man over natural objects’, and therefore ‘they 
remain bound to the tendency already predom- 
inant in Marx, to instrumentally foreshorten 
human history to a developmental unfolding 
of the societal processing of nature’ (1995; 71).
7 Honneth initially attempts to outline a ‘social-theoretical alternative’ to what he ultimately sees 
as a ‘functionalist’ programme implicit in the original project of the inner circle of the Frankfurt 
School (Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, among one or two others) by referring to those more 
marginal members (Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Walter Benjamin) in whose work he sees 
an implicit reference to an alternative communicative project (see Honneth 1995; 61–91). 
8 Honneth sees this analysis of culture as particularly exemplified in Adorno’s work on the culture 
industry. Despite his earlier criticisms of Adorno, his more recent work has shown signs of re-
newed appreciation for Adorno’s work. See Honneth (2005), and his essay ‘The Possibility of a 
Disclosing Critique of Society: The Dialectic of Enlightenment in Light of Current Debates in 
Social Criticism’, in Honneth (2007).
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Once social action is only seen through the 
lens of a subject/object logic (what Honneth 
refers to as a ‘logic of reification’), and then 
applied to ‘the three dimensions of societal 
labour, the socialisation of individuals and, 
finally, social domination’ (Honneth 1995; 75), 
a key problem emerges where a whole range of 
communicative practices and social achieve-
ments, such as developments in legal equality 
and process along with extended individual 
freedoms, fall out of the picture. It also appears 
that society reproduces itself separately from 
the intersubjective (and creative) social action 
and self-understanding of its members. It is this 
impoverished conception of social action, with 
its emphasis on the social domination of nature 
and its parallels with social class domination 
and individual self-discipline that is central to 
the ‘communicative turn’ in Habermas’s work, 
and that becomes integral to the development 
of Honneth’s.
For Honneth (1991), Adorno and Hork-
heimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment and the 
further ‘repression of the social’ in Adorno’s later 
work, marks a theoretical shift in the 1940s. 
A more pessimistic philosophy of history is 
assumed – in the light of Fascism and Stalin-
ism, and the integration of the working class in 
the commodified and administered society of 
the US – and an increasing scepticism around 
the possibilities of progress and civilisation 
inaug urates a re-thinking of their philosophy 
of history in the direction of a ‘logic of disin-
tegration’ from the origin of the species to the 
barbarism evident in Fascism (Honneth 1995; 
73). This grand philosophy of history adheres 
to the previous emphasis on work and the social 
mastery of nature, but no longer in the direc-
tion of Marx’s broadly positive account of the 
emancipatory potential latent in scientific and 
technological developments. Instead, Adorno 
and Horkheimer emphasise the cognitive 
component of the mastery of nature that they 
associate with ‘objectivised thinking’ or ‘instru-
mental rationality’ – the reification of thought 
apparent in human interaction with nature – 
and emphasise a broadly Weberian conception 
of formal rationality at work in the scientific and 
technological domination of nature.9
What also arises here for Honneth is the 
related issue of providing a theoretical justifica-
tion for (rational) critique, given the entwine-
ment of rationality and domination. If social 
practice and consciousness, as the possible 
(social) sources for independent and critical 
consciousness, have become completely reified, 
then any attempt at social critique that grounds 
itself in social reality must be considered 
9 It is the Marxist reception of Max Weber’s theory of rationalisation and the ‘disenchantment 
of the world’ in Lukács, Adorno and Horkheimer that Habermas also blames for the impasse 
reached by early Critical Theory (Habermas 1984; Chapter IV). Whereas from Lukács to Alfred 
Sohn-Rethel, the forms of consciousness of bourgeois society are traceable to the abstract nature 
of commodity exchange (Lukács 1971, and Sohn-Rethel 1978), in the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
commodity exchange is seen as the modern form of a broader instrumental rationality; as a form 
of mediation that generalises the type of rationality that developed out of the aims of self-preser-
vation in the human confrontation with nature.
140
Critical Theory Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 2017/1 (40), (Online) ISSN 2335-8890
impossible. Or, to put it another way, if mun-
dane social experience is considered from the 
viewpoint of the ‘administered society’, then 
any attempt to identify a critical element of 
‘intramundane transcendence’ will be found 
wanting (Honneth 1991; 129). Honneth 
therefore suggests that early Critical Theory 
fails to ground its critical position in ‘actual 
social experience’. He argues that Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s reduction of social action to the 
realm of social labour, and their account of the 
administered society, impoverishes a Critical 
Theory that seeks to ground its reflective posi-
tion in practical social activity. Furthermore, as 
their philosophy ‘already makes the pure act of 
conceptual operation into an elementary form 
of instrumental reason’, Honneth argues that ‘it 
cannot justify any form of discursive thought, 
even its own’ (1991; 61–62). Without a form 
of rationality free from domination, they are 
unable to ground a (rational) critical position 
able to provide an account of the (rational) 
possibility of emancipation (Honneth 1995; 
61–91).10 Their theoretical position is reduced 
to a utopian negativity that exposes any (false) 
claims to social reconciliation. And without a 
pre-theoretical resource for social emancipa-
tion apparent in social history, their critical 
position – particularly Adorno’s – ends up 
seeking grounding in the non-instrumental, yet 
rarefied, sensuous particularities of modern art 
(Adorno 1997).11
However, as I will argue later, despite some 
validity in these criticisms of earlier Criti-
cal Theory, Honneth’s tendency to embrace 
Habermas’s communicative turn, albeit in a 
recognitive direction, throws up a number of 
significant theoretical issues which Adorno’s 
commitment to particularity and non-identity, 
and to an aesthetic praxis, might help us to 
resolve. In particular, his work poses a number 
of challenges to Honneth’s emphasis on recog-
nition and explores a number of the ways in 
which we are often structurally compelled to 
10 As philosophy itself is intimately tied to instrumental thought, Honneth argues that Adorno 
and Horkheimer limit its activity to the negative task of criticising conceptual thinking, and 
renounce the possibility of any claims to positive knowledge. This negative task of philosophy is 
the logical conclusion to their attempts to avoid self-contradiction, and is an idea that is explicitly 
worked through in Adorno’s 1966 work, Negative Dialectics (Adorno 1990). However, Adorno 
would suggest that reason might be predominantly instrumental but is also able to criticise itself 
and recognise its own complicity in domination (which in turn has important educational and 
transformative value etc.). Arguably, the emphasis on contradiction and particularity in dialecti-
cal thinking, alongside Adorno’s appeal to aesthetics and ethics, suggest that reason need not be 
(perpetually) instrumental (Adorno 1990).
11 Adorno appeals to the realm of aesthetics due to his belief that art, although still cognitive, allows 
for non-conceptual (and non-instrumental and non-coercive) knowledge of reality and freedom. 
Adorno’s position does not seek merely to emphasise the realm of art and aesthetics as a counter-
weight to the dominance of science and morality, but instead, and more radically, conceives of art 
and aesthetics as a realm cast out from truth, and therefore as a realm which contains the deeper 
(reflective) truth concerning the partial nature of, and the damage done to truth by, subsumptive 
reason and universal morality. For an outline of Adorno’s aesthetic theory, see Adorno (1997), and 
for an excellent extension of these arguments see Bernstein (1993).
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mis recognise others whilst denying our own 
desire for recognition.
The Communicative Turn
The unsatisfactory negativism that Hon-
neth associates with early Critical Theory leaves 
him in no doubt as to the pressing problem of 
contemporary Critical Theory:
If the Left-Hegelian model of critique is to be 
retained at all, we must first re-establish theo-
retical access to the social sphere in which an 
interest in emancipation can be anchored pre-
theoretically. Without some form of proof that 
its critical perspective is reinforced by a need or 
movement within social reality, Critical Theory 
cannot be further pursued in any way today, for 
it would be no longer capable of distinguish-
ing itself from other models of social critique in 
its claim to a superior sociological explanatory 
substance or in its philosophical procedures of 
justification. (Honneth 2007; 66)
Given the nature of the impasse of early 
Critical Theory according to Honneth, what 
is therefore needed is (i) a non-instrumental 
form of rationality, such that all conceptual 
knowledge is not simply a reflection of the 
instrumental demands of social domination 
and the domination of nature, thereby avoid-
ing the contradiction of attempting to present 
a ‘rational’ critique of society while arguing 
for the entwinement of rationality and domi- 
n ation;12 and (ii) evidence of a pre-theoretical 
(‘critical’) resource in social reality, i.e. a form 
of practical social critique or concrete social 
‘interest’ in emancipation that can provide 
Honneth with a pre-theoretical resource for his 
renewed ‘critical’ theory. Following Habermas, 
Honneth hopes that these tasks are satisfied by 
the communicative turn. By outlining a logic 
of ‘intersubjectivity’ at work in an alternative 
‘communicative rationality’ which is relatively 
autonomous in relation to social labour and the 
instrumental domination of nature, Habermas 
and Honneth hope to sidestep the philosophy 
of consciousness, and identify a pre-theoretical 
resource for critique in the emancipatory pos-
sibilities at work in the ‘conditions for the com-
municative sociation of individuals’ (Habermas 
1984; 398) – be they ‘built into the linguistic 
mechanism of the reproduction of the species’ 
(ibid.) for Habermas, or ultimately apparent 
in ‘identity claims acquired in socialisation’ for 
Honneth (2007; 70).
Habermas’s work represents the important 
alternative to earlier Critical Theory for Hon-
neth, and opens up the possibility of meeting 
Horkheimer’s original criteria. His ‘paradigm 
of communicative action’ replaces the Marxist 
12 Adorno, however, would refuse the temptation to clearly separate out freedom (or rationality) 
and domination, as is the tendency in Habermas and Honneth. For interesting accounts of the 
‘aporia and determinate negation of morality’ in Adorno, which emphasise both the repressive 
and emancipatory moments in morality, see Schweppenhauser (2004) and Menke (2004). Simon 
Jarvis usefully highlights the related point that Dialectic of Enlightenment avoids the separation of 
social action and (a pre-social) nature we find in cultural idealism, and instead seeks a ‘reconcili-
ation of culture and nature’ (Jarvis 1998; 35), whereby happiness would involve more than ‘free 
and rational intersubjectivity’ and would include ‘bodily delight’ along with freedom from self-
preservation and ‘material suffering’ (ibid.; 221).
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emphasis on production and social labour, 
and pins its hopes for emancipatory action 
and social progress on the rational potential 
inherent in ‘social interaction’.13 The ‘rational 
potential of communicative action’ is found in 
the norm ative presuppositions contained in 
the pragmatics of language, and it is here (in 
this ‘pre-theoretical sphere of emancipation’) 
that Habermas is able to ground his norma-
tive position. Put rather simply, in the process 
of communicative action, we carry with us 
certain norm ative expectations connected to 
the linguistic rules that are implicit in commu-
nication geared towards understanding. Should 
our normative expectations not be fulfilled, 
certain moral demands arise that expose the 
forms of domination at work in current forms 
of communicative action. In comparison to 
Horkheimer who initially ‘saw capitalist rela-
tions of production as setting unjustified limits 
on the development of the human capacity 
for labour’, Honneth suggests that Habermas 
‘sees the social relations of communication as 
putting unjust restrictions on the emancipa-
tory potential of intersubjective understanding’ 
(Honneth 2007; 69).14 By arguing that there 
is a normative impulse at the very heart of hu-
man communication, and that this normative 
impulse is expressed in the (implicit) linguistic 
rules of communication, Habermas is in a posi-
tion to propose a ‘critical’ theory that aims to 
highlight, and hopefully contribute to chang-
ing, the social obstacles that impede the full 
expression of these rules.15
Habermas emphasises that subjects are 
always already in relation to each other due to 
processes of linguistic understanding, and it is 
this language-mediated intersubjectivity which 
13 As Habermas had already argued in Theory and Practice, ‘Marx does not actually explicate the 
interrelationship of interaction and labour, but instead, under the unspecific title of social praxis, 
reduces the one to the other, namely: communicative action to instrumental action’ (Habermas 
1974; 129).
14 Again, to put it rather crudely, we could say that for Habermas at the very heart of all human ac-
tion is the use of language, and when we use language we commit ourselves to a number of (uni-
versal) ‘validity claims’ that we may be asked to justify on the basis of defensible ‘reasons’. These 
unavoidable validity claims introduce a moral commitment into our interactions with others and 
provide the possibility for consensus and social order. Should our communication breakdown in 
some way, we will (or should) move to a level of ‘discourse’, with the aim of reaching a new level 
of understanding and consensus. The discourse we engage in over particular validity claims can be 
characterised as theoretical (truthful), moral-practical (right) or aesthetic (sincere) discourse (see 
Habermas 1990). Habermas extends these validity claims with additional logical-semantic and 
procedural rules (1990; 87–88), as well as a third set of ‘social’ rules specific to post-conventional 
contexts (ibid.; 89).
15 Habermas’s own version of ‘critical’ theory famously attempts to make the distinction between 
‘false’ freedom and ‘true’ freedom, ‘pseudo-communication’ and ‘true’ communication, through 
recourse to an ‘ideal speech situation’ (Habermas 1974; 19). He is keen to emphasise that ‘true’ 
freedom is not achievable without the possibility of real, free and open communication leading to 
consensus. However, he has to be able to distinguish between true and false communication by 
setting out a critical standpoint from which actual (and particular) forms of public discourse and 
consensus can be critically exposed as illusory (see Habermas 1973 in McCarthy 1978; 301).
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distinguishes human beings as a species.16 Social 
reproduction cannot simply be seen in terms 
of, or as determined by, material reproduc-
tion, but rather language and communication 
must be seen as playing an equally important 
role in history. Equipped with his distinction 
between ‘labour’ and ‘interaction’, Habermas 
attempts to further develop a theory of societal 
rationalisation that outlines the different forms 
of knowledge production and rationality associ-
ated with each (Habermas 1987a). He wants 
to demonstrate not only the development of 
strategic action in society through the lens of 
social labour and political administration, but 
also to identify a separate communicative sphere 
whereby certain institutions play the role of 
reducing barriers to the free communication of 
those social norms and values which are central 
to social integration and reproduction. From 
here, according to Honneth, the task is set for 
Habermas to not only develop his outline of 
the linguistic presuppositions of language and 
communication, but also (i) a notion of social 
evolution able to explain the process of societal 
rationalisation (in both instrumental and com-
municative spheres), and (ii) an outline of the 
ways in which ‘realms of social action become 
independent purposive-rationally organised 
systems’ (Honneth 1995; 88).17
Habermas’s development of these themes 
throughout his Theory of Communicative Action 
(1984 and 1987b) provides Honneth with an 
alternative ‘communicative-theoretic’ version of 
Critical Theory, and Habermas is applauded for 
developing a historical account of societal devel-
opment from the standpoint of communicative 
rationality. Habermas sees the development of 
‘systemic’ forms of strat egic action as increasingly 
separate from other communicative forms of so-
cial life, which he collectively refers to as the ‘life-
world’.18 He is then able to conceive of a dualistic 
development of society, albeit one where the two 
logics of development are unevenly weighted. 
Communicative rationality and linguistic un-
derstanding are seen as fundamental to social 
reproduction, whereas the norm-free sphere of 
action encapsulated in his notion of ‘system’ 
is conceived of as a historical consequence of 
16 Honneth explores many of these ideas in his early work on philosophical anthropology, particu-
larly his work with Hans Joas – see Honneth and Joas (1988). Here Ludwig Feuerbach is identi-
fied as playing a key role in outlining the ‘a priori intersubjectivity of the human being’ (ibid.; 15) 
and Marx’s work (along with the work of George Herbert Mead, Michel Foucault, Norbert Elias 
and Habermas) is also dissected for its intersubjective insights.
17 Again, there is limited space to explore the details of Habermas’s key ideas in any depth here; 
these core ideas remain the key theme throughout his work, but they are predominantly explored 
in Habermas (1979, 1984, 1987a, 1987b, 1990). Here I am also neglecting Habermas’s work on 
religion and Europe which has been at the heart of his more recent publications. See Habermas 
(2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2012).
18 Habermas suggests that the lifeworld is made up of those spheres outside of formal economic and 
political life that serve the function of symbolic reproduction, e.g. family, cultural tradition, me-
dia, community groups, social movements etc. It provides shared meanings, consensus and social 
integration, and transmits knowledge and traditional beliefs. He argues that it serves a number of 
functions that have increasingly become separated over the course of social evolution: specifically 
cultural reproduction, social integration and socialisation (1987; 152). 
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a process of abstraction.19 Although the eco-
nomic and political subsystems of the ‘system’ 
developed out of the lifeworld, and continue to 
rely on it for normative reproduction, they cease 
to be as amenable to the questioning of validity 
claims and tend to invade and dislocate lifeworld 
relations and produce a series of ‘social patholo-
gies’ in a process that ultimately leads to a crisis 
in cultural reproduction – anomie, alienation, 
disintegration, instability, and lack of personal 
responsibility (Habermas 1987b; 142–145). 
The systemic forms of instrumental action are 
not to be seen simply as the logical outcome of 
humanity’s mastery of nature, but rather as the 
outcome of a process of societal rationalisation 
emerging from the lifeworld. Consequently, it is 
not merely the existence of such instrumentally 
driven forms of admin istration, organisation 
and steering that pose the problem for contem-
porary society, but rather the way in which they 
unjustifiably encroach on those areas of social life 
premised on communicative understanding – 
what he calls the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ 
(Habermas 1984).
However, a key problem emerges here for 
Honneth in that Habermas produces an ac-
count of social evolution in terms of a conflict 
between communicative and purposive-ratio-
nal action spheres, rather than conflict within a 
wider process of understanding between social 
classes or groups. This conflict is not seen as 
being mediated through social struggle, but 
rather as a process of rationalisation over and 
above classes, whereby the purposive-rational 
actions, whose origin is in intersubjectively 
produced norms, assume a life of their own 
and adversely turn upon the sphere of social 
interaction.20 Habermas is seen as reifying the 
distinction between the two action spheres 
by perceiving the sphere of communicative 
action as limited in its influence on the sphere 
of purposive-rational action, which itself in 
turn only acts destructively upon the com-
municative sphere of action. For Honneth, 
as for a number of other critics,21 Habermas’s 
conception of contemporary capitalist societies 
here, in terms of the autonomous and opposing 
spheres of system and lifeworld, leads to what 
19 He uses the term ‘system’ for those aspects of modern societies that co-ordinate strategic action 
geared towards the material, rather than symbolic, reproduction of society. He argues that the 
system has, necessarily, become ‘uncoupled’ from the communicative context of the lifeworld, and 
institutionalised in the form of the modern state and modern economy, with money and power 
as ‘steering media’.
20 It is worth noting here that Honneth is also particularly critical of Habermas’s tendency to reduce 
work to instrumental action and therefore to give up on a ‘critical concept of work’. For Hon-
neth’s attempts to work through these issues, see his ‘Domination and Moral Struggle’, ‘Work and 
Instrumental Action’, and ‘Moral Consciousness and Class Domination’ in Honneth (1995). For 
an excellent study that explores these earlier elements of Honneth’s thought, see Deranty (2009).
21 See McCarthy (1991) and Fraser (1989). Fraser also argues that this split has consequences for the 
theoretical understanding of gender as well, as Habermas’s assumption that the family is simply 
characterised in lifeworld terms separately from the system, risks missing the elements of power 
in gender relations, and also risks glossing over important issues such as unpaid (domestic) labour 
(Fraser 1989; 118–120). 
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Honneth calls ‘complementary fictions’ or rei-
fications resulting in the supposition of ‘(1) the 
existence of norm-free organisations of action 
and (2) the existence of power-free spheres of 
communic ation’ (Honneth 1991; 298). Hon-
neth opposes the notion of ‘norm-free’ strate-
gic action by arguing that ‘the organisational 
structures of management and administration 
can be generally clarified only as institutional 
embodiments of both purposive-rational and 
political-practical principles’ (ibid.). He criti-
cises the notion of ‘power-free communication’ 
by questioning Habermas’s presupposition of 
the cognitive separation of actions oriented to 
success and actions oriented to understand-
ing, as well as the fiction of a social lifeworld 
that is reproduced independently of strategic 
influences. Furthermore, if power is only 
considered at the level of systems integration, 
Honneth argues that Habermas ignores ‘the 
importance of pre-state, situationally bound 
forms of the exercise of everyday domination in 
the reproduction of a society’; and conversely, 
if social integration is only perceived in life-
world practices concerned with the symbolic 
reproduction of society, then he ignores ‘the 
importance of processes of social interaction 
internal to an organisation for the functioning 
of social organisations’ (ibid.; 301).
For Honneth, Habermas’s social theory 
ends up with an analysis of the social conse-
quences of autonomous power complexes, 
and his dualism of system/lifeworld parallels 
that of an organisation/individual dualism in 
Adorno’s work, and a power apparatus/human 
body dualism in the work of Michel Foucault 
(ibid.);22 all of these ultimately adhere to what 
Honneth calls a ‘systems-theoretic’, rather than 
a ‘communication-theoretic’, approach. The 
central pathology of contemporary society for 
Habermas becomes the ‘penetration of systemic 
forms of steering into the previously intact 
region of a communicative everyday practice’ 
(ibid.; 302). However, despite this conception 
of social spheres as systems, Honneth sees 
Habermas’s approach as having the advantage 
over earlier critical social theorists due to 
the serious consideration of moral processes 
of understanding through his notion of the 
centrality of communicative action for social 
reproduction. Yet, the dualistic conclusions of 
Habermas’s thought lead to a two-fold sacri-
fice. On the one hand Habermas abandons a 
conception of ‘the communicative organisation 
of material production which, under the title 
“self-administration”, belongs to the productive 
part of the tradition of critical Marxism’, thereby 
sacrificing ‘the possibility of a justified critique 
22 Honneth’s initial attempts to transcend the Habermasian divisions with a notion of ‘morally mo-
tivated struggle’ (1996; 1) also employed a conception of struggle taken from Foucault’s notion 
of discipline. Honneth brings Foucault into the problematic of Frankfurt School Critical Theory 
as an alternative ‘rediscovery of the social’ alongside Habermas’s communicative approach (Hon-
neth 1991). However, Foucault’s work is increasingly seen as emphasising the all-encompassing 
disciplining power of modern institutions at a distance from his starting point of the unceasing 
process of social struggle, and ends up as a ‘functionalist’ account of ‘the augmentation of social 
power’ and social control whereby social groups end up as the mere effects of such systemic pro-
cesses (ibid.; 199). 
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of concrete forms of organisation of economic 
production and political administration’ (ibid.; 
303). On the other hand, he ends up sacrificing,
the communication-theoretic approach he had 
initially opened up: the potential for an under-
standing of the social order as an institution-
ally mediated communicative relation between 
culturally integrated groups that, so long as the 
exercise of power is asymmetrically distributed, 
takes place through the medium of social strug-
gle. (ibid.) 
Honneth (2007; 70) is also critical of the 
‘emancipatory process in which Habermas so-
cially anchors the normative perspective of his 
critical theory’. For Honneth, the key character-
istic of Critical Theory is its attempt to ground 
its ‘critical’ (i.e. potentially emancipatory) intent 
in what he calls the ‘pre-theoretical resource’ 
apparent in social needs or social movements; 
without this critical theory becomes just another 
form of social (scientific) critique. The problem, 
according to Honneth, is that the ‘critical’ and 
emancipatory element of Habermas’s theory ap-
peals to the normative presuppositions ‘implicit’ 
in linguistic understanding and is therefore too 
far removed from the actual (moral) experiences 
of social actors. If a pre-theoretical resource for 
a ‘critical’ perspective is to be found in social 
reality, then Honneth suggests that it has to ar-
ticulate ‘an existing experience of social injustice’ 
(ibid.).23 Habermas’s theory still meets Hork-
heimer’s methodological criteria, by replacing 
social labour with communicative understand-
ing, but he has no replacement for the moral 
experiences of injustice faced by the proletariat. 
It was these practical experiences that provided 
the everyday social reality and pre-theoretical re-
source for Horkheimer’s normative standpoint, 
experiences that could be articulated in a more 
systematic manner in the form of a ‘critical’ 
theory. Honneth follows Habermas in rejecting 
the idea that the possibility of emancipation 
is attributable to ‘a group of people who have 
nothing but socio-economic circumstances in 
common’, but he follows Horkheimer in seek-
ing to identify the moral experiences of social 
actors that would indicate the justifiability of 
a ‘critical’ normative standpoint. The ‘com-
municative rationalisation of the lifeworld’, 
whereby the linguistic rules of understanding 
are developed, and become apparent, occurs 
‘behind the backs of the subjects involved; its 
course is neither directed by human intentions 
nor can it be grasped within the consciousness 
of a single individual’ (ibid.). 
23 Honneth’s criticisms here are in line with a number of Hegelian-inclined criticisms of Haber-
mas’s work. Habermas might be able to tell us what the presuppositions of communication are, 
and also what social conditions need to be in place for us to fully exercise our communicative 
competences, but it is still too rarefied to guide everyday social actors in their specific duties. 
He arguably purifies the ideals of communicative reason and turns practical norms into formal-
theoretical norms on the assumption that their formality is what provides them with universality 
and ‘rational’ authority, thereby depriving these norms of their link to action, motivation and 
solidarity (see Bernstein 2005; 307–308; Pensky 2011; 136). See also Benhabib (1986; 321), 
Pippin (1997; 157–184), and Putnam (2004; 111–134). For an important critique of Habermas’s 
notion of universalisability as ‘culturally-specific’ as well as gendered, classed and racialised, see 
Young (1996; 123 in Ashenden and Owen 1999; 139).
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I agree with Honneth here in his Hegelian 
criticisms of Habermas’s overly dualistic and 
purified distinction between communicative 
and purposive-rational action spheres, as well as 
the subsequent loss of the ‘productive part of the 
tradition of critical Marxism’ in the conception 
of ‘the communicative organisation of material 
production’. I also agree with his critique of the 
emancipatory potential in Habermas’s emphasis 
on the normative presuppositions ‘implicit’ in 
linguistic understanding, due to the distance 
between this ‘critical’ normative position and 
the concrete experiences of social actors. As we 
will see, Honneth’s alternative ‘critical’ theory 
seeks to close this gap between the (moral) 
experiences of social actors and the reflective 
critical-theoretical position they provide a pre-
theoretical resource for, and to make stronger 
motivational links between experiences of injus-
tice and emancipatory politics. However, I also 
argue that his success here is limited and that 
we witness a repetition of Habermas’s tendency 
to purify and idealise, although now transposed 
to a notion of recognition, and a ‘formal con-
ception of ethical life’ founded on recognition 
relations which is also ultimately too formal to 
produce solidarity or motivate action and which 
abstracts from difference and particularity.
Honneth’s Recognitive Turn
Honneth points to his specific resolution of 
the problems he identifies in Habermas’s work 
by seeking to broaden what is at stake in our 
processes of social interaction. He is still work-
ing with a Habermasian notion of the norma-
tive presuppositions of communicative action, 
but seeks to make them more substantial than 
Habermas’s linguistic account; he does this by 
making these presuppositions into explicitly 
social prerequisites for successful self-relations. 
Rather than isolating the linguistic rules implicit 
in communicative action, Honneth wants to 
emphasise how human subjects can only be 
said to have moral experiences, and to respond 
to a sense of injustice, when a broader sense 
of self is under threat. He argues that subjects 
‘experience an impairment of what we can 
call their moral experiences, i.e., their “moral 
point of view”, not as a restriction of intuitively 
mastered rules of language, but as a violation of 
identity claims acquired in socialisation’ (Hon-
neth 2007; 70).24 The normative potential of 
social interaction is found within the moral 
experiences of disrespect at work in everyday 
communication and emerges from the lack of 
recognition given to one’s (implicit) identity 
claims. Evidence for such experiences is sought 
in historical and sociological studies, such as 
those by Barrington Moore, Jr., (1978) or E.P. 
Thompson (1963), which are concerned with 
the everyday social resistance of the lower social 
classes. What Honneth sees here are examples 
of resistance that, rather than resulting from 
explicitly articulated moral principles, emerge 
out of implicit and intuitive notions of justice, 
24 Honneth seeks to prevent Habermas’s ‘idealising presuppositions’ concerning rules of language 
from forming a moral law without connection to the moral self-understanding of social agents, 
thereby reproducing the problem of motivation for which Hegel criticises Kant. See Hegel (1967; 
§133–135).
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unarticulated raw material that can be worked 
up into positive moral principles. He argues that 
‘the normative presupposition of all commu- 
nicative action is to be seen in the acquisition of 
social recognition’, and that ‘subjects encounter 
each other within the parameters of the recipro-
cal expectation that they be given recognition as 
moral persons and for their social achievements’ 
(Honneth 2007; 71).
Honneth is therefore able to make a stronger 
link than Habermas between the normative 
presuppositions of social interaction and the 
moral feelings of those involved. By identifying 
the need for recognition as a core (anthropologi-
cal) aspect of the development of our identities, 
Honneth argues that any threat to such recog-
nition in the form of ‘social disrespect’ will 
lead to a threat to our very identity and will 
inevitably evoke feelings of ‘shame, anger or 
indignation’ (ibid.; 72). It is these feelings in the 
face of ‘structural forms of disrespect’ that pro-
vide Honneth with the ‘pre-theoretical resource’ 
for a coherent Critical Theory, and he develops 
these ideas in more detail in his Struggle for 
Recognition (1996). Here he turns to the notion 
of recognition in the Jena writings of the young 
Hegel and seeks to identify the communicative 
presuppositions involved in successful identity-
formation, with recourse to the importance of 
autonomy and self-realisation.25 He argues that:
Hegel was convinced that a struggle among sub-
jects for the mutual recognition of their iden-
tity generated inner societal pressure toward the 
practical, political establishment of institutions 
that would guarantee freedom. It is individuals’ 
claim to the intersubjective recognition of their 
identity that is built into social life from the very 
beginning as a moral tension, transcends the 
level of social progress institutionalised thus far, 
and so gradually leads – via the negative path of 
recurring stages of conflict – to a state of com-
municatively lived freedom. (Honneth 1996; 5)
He takes from Hegel’s System of Ethical Life a 
distinction between three forms of recog nition: 
(i) the ‘affective relationship of recognition 
found in the family’ where we are ‘recognised 
as concrete creatures of need’, (ii) the ‘cognitive-
formal relationship of recognition found in law’ 
involving recognition ‘as abstract legal persons’, 
and (iii) the ‘emotionally enlightened relation-
ship of recognition found in the state’, where 
we are ‘recognised as concrete universals [...] as 
subjects who are socialised in their particularity’ 
(ibid.; 25).26
25 As they did for Habermas, Hegel’s Jena writings serve Honneth’s project well due to their empha-
sis on the moral-developmental potential of conflict between social subjects for the collective ethi-
cal life of the community. Criticising the atomism at work in the Hobbesian notion of struggle 
and the natural law tradition, Hegel proposes that intersubjective forms are always already part of 
human nature and at the heart of every process of human socialisation. Social struggle is under-
stood to be driven by moral impulses rather than by motives of self-interest and preservation, and 
the life of the community is not to be conceived of in terms of a necessary limitation of individual 
liberty, but rather as opening up the possibility for the freedom of every individual.
26 In his account of Hegel’s ‘absolute ethical life’, Honneth emphasises the point that intersubjective 
relations extend beyond cognitive recognition and ‘provide the communicative basis upon which 
individuals, who have been isolated from each other by legal relations, can be reunited within the 
context of an ethical community’ (1996; 24). This Hegelian conception of the State would result 
in the ‘respect of each and every person for the biographical particularity of every other’ becoming 
‘the habitual underpinnings of a society’s common mores’ (ibid.; 58).
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Honneth now sets himself three tasks in 
relation to Hegel’s theory. Firstly he attempts to 
rid Hegel’s thesis of what he sees as its specula-
tive foundation by using empirical social psy-
chology, in the form of George Herbert Mead, 
to ground the importance of intersubjective 
relationships27 – i.e. to demonstrate that the 
intersubjective process of identity development, 
whereby individuals only recognise themselves 
as ‘individuated selves’ through the confirma-
tion of others, is an empirical event in the 
social world.28 Secondly, he seeks to develop 
an ‘empirically supported phenomenology’ 
able to concretise the different forms of mutual 
recognition that Hegel had ‘constructed purely 
conceptually to cover empirical reality’ (ibid.; 
69). The forms of mutual recognition discern-
ible in Hegel’s System of Ethical Life and Real-
philosophie – what Honneth calls ‘love’, ‘law’ and 
‘ethical life’ – are to be read as relations whereby 
individuals recognise each other in increasingly 
individuated and autonomous ways. Finally, 
Honneth seeks to develop Hegel’s idea of a 
parallel development between the sequence of 
forms of recognition presupposed in successful 
ego-development (i.e. love, rights and solidar-
ity) and the formation of societal structures that 
develop as a result of moral struggle. In sum, he 
argues that incomplete identity formation, due 
to the incomplete nature of societal structures 
of recognition, produces an experience of dis-
respect that informs individuals of the ‘absence 
of recognition’, and impels them to engage in 
intersubjective conflicts resulting in the (insti-
tutionally-mediated) social affirmation of new 
claims to mutual recognition and autonomy. 
Love, Rights & Solidarity
Not only does Honneth seek to justify the 
three-fold division of forms of recognition he 
finds in Hegel and Mead, with recourse to em-
pirical research from individual sciences, but also 
to identify those forms of disrespect that mark 
the negative elements of recognition relations. 
These forms of disrespect would not only allow 
subjects to perceive their lack of re cognition, 
but would also provide the motivation for 
them to engage in struggles for recognition. 
What Honneth wants to do in distinguishing 
between the three forms of recognition – love, 
rights and solidarity – and in testing them in 
relation to empirical studies, is demonstrate that 
they form ‘independent types with regard to 
(i) the medium of recognition, (ii) the form of 
the relation-to-self made possible, and (iii) the 
27 According to Honneth (1996; 29), Hegel’s ‘original plan’ is sacrificed in the development of his 
thought in favour of the ‘philosophy of consciousness’ apparent in the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Honneth agrees with Habermas and Michael Theunissen in arguing that the later Hegel sacrifices 
his earlier work on intersubjectivity in favour of absolute spirit or the rational state (see Habermas 
1992 and Theunissen 1991).
28 Honneth uses Mead’s notions of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ as ‘empirical’ justification for the necessity 
of the perception of the other in the development of self-consciousness. However, he has since 
largely abandoned Mead due to him not providing a sufficient normative dimension for recog-
nitive relations – e.g. he ‘reduces recognition to the act of reciprocal perspective-taking, without 
the character of the other’s action being of any crucial significance’ (2002; 502).
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potential for moral development’ (Honneth 
1996; 95). Alongside the forms of recognition 
are discernible forms of social disrespect which 
match up to the practical relations-to-self, and 
Honneth wants to determine how ‘the expe- 
r ience of disrespect is anchored in the affective 
life of human subjects in such a way that it can 
provide the motivational impetus for social 
resistance and conflict, indeed, for a struggle 
for recognition’ (ibid.; 132).
‘Love’ as the first stage of mutual recog-
nition involves subjects responding to each 
other’s needs and recognising each other as 
needy beings. Subjects come to recognise their 
dependence upon each other and also that their 
recognition must take the form of affective 
approval and esteem. In an attempt to em-
pirically support Hegel’s assertion that love be 
understood as ‘being oneself in another’, Hon-
neth turns to psychoanalytic object-relations 
theory – particularly the work of Donald Win-
nicott (1971) and Jessica Benjamin (1988) – 
which he sees as dealing particularly well with 
the mutual balance between independence and 
attachment necessary in those primary relation-
ships of reciprocal recognition. The emphasis 
here is on the psychological importance of early 
interactive experiences, in addition to libidinal 
drives, and how the success of such early af-
fectional bonds depends upon the capacity of 
the child and ‘mother’ to successfully balance 
self-assertion and symbiosis.29 The negotiation 
between forms of boundary-dissolution and 
boundary-establishment in later relationships 
develops out of this originary experience of 
symbiosis and can take the form of unforced 
moments in friendship or sexual union in erotic 
relationships. These intimate forms of recog-
nition provide ‘a type of relation-to-self in which 
subjects mutually acquire basic confidence in 
themselves’, and they are ‘both conceptually 
and genetically prior to every other form of 
reciprocal recognition’ (Honneth 1996; 107). 
He outlines how physical injury, especially in 
the form of torture or rape, deprives a subject of 
the ability to dispose over his or her own body. 
These most fundamental forms of ‘disrespect’ 
not only cause physical pain to its victim, but 
also affect their practical-relation-to-self by 
damaging the basic self-confidence, acquired 
through love, in autonomously controlling 
one’s own body.
The recognition relation at work in the 
sphere of ‘law’ is based on the notion that we 
can only understand ourselves as legal persons, 
with rights in relation to others and assurances 
that our claims will be satisfied, once we have 
assumed the position of the ‘generalised other’ 
and recognised others as bearers of ‘rights’.30 
On the premise that subjects will accept legal 
29 For important feminist critiques of Honneth’s notion of love, and his characterisation of the 
mother-infant relationship, see Allen (2010), Young (2007), Meehan (2011), and Butler in Hon-
neth (2008; 107). At the heart of their criticisms is Honneth’s neglect of the unequal power 
relationships already at work in such ‘primary’ relationships. Meehan also questions Honneth’s 
tendency to describe the initial mother-child relationship as one of symbiosis rather than ac-
knowledging research that emphasises distinctive selves within the first few days.
30 Here Honneth outlines the historical transition from ‘traditional legal relations’, whereby the 
recognition of an individual as a legal person is tied to the social esteem accorded to their social 
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norms if they have been able to freely agree to 
them on an equal basis, a recognition relation 
is established whereby legal subjects ‘recognise 
each other as persons capable of autonomously 
making reasonable decisions about moral 
norms’ (ibid.; 110). Here Honneth outlines a 
historical development of personhood, seen in 
terms of an increase in individual rights-claims, 
whereby the definition of a morally responsible 
person is expanded due to certain struggles for 
recognition, which highlight the increasing 
number of prerequisites, and which have to be 
taken into consideration for participation in 
rational will-formation.31 Utilising the work 
of T. H. Marshall (1963), and his historical 
distinction between civil, political and social 
rights, Honneth identifies two developmental 
paths that mark the continuation of the struggle 
for recognition in the legal sphere. The principle 
of ‘equality’ in modern law leads not only to a 
broadening of the content of the status of a legal 
person, in terms of differences in individual 
opportunities for taking advantage of socially 
guaranteed freedoms, but also to the expan-
sion of such status to an increasing number of 
prev iously excluded people. The conflicts that 
arise in the legal sphere therefore are responses 
to a lack of recognition or being treated with 
disrespect, and aim to expand both the ‘sub-
stantive content and social scope of the status 
of a legal person’ (Honneth 1996; 118). Being 
denied rights not only limits an individual’s 
autonomy, but also takes away their ability to 
experience themselves, according to intersub-
jective expectations, as a morally responsible 
partner-to-interaction.
Having outlined the spheres of love and 
law, Honneth now turns to the importance of 
the recognition relation he terms ‘solidarity’ – 
the relation, discernible in Hegel’s concept 
of ‘ethical life’, that recognises an individual’s 
particular traits and abilities. Honneth stresses 
how this recognition relation presupposes an 
‘intersubjectively shared value-horizon’ in that 
subjects can ‘mutually esteem each other only 
on the condition that they share an orientation 
to those values and goals that indicate to each 
other the significance or contribution of their 
qualities for the life of the other’ (ibid.; 121). 
The social medium that is required to fulfil the 
task of expressing individual differences in a 
universal and intersubjective manner, rather 
than the universal characteristics of human 
subjects found in modern law, Honneth terms 
the ‘cultural self-understanding of a society’. 
This cultural self-understanding is therefore the 
measure used for the social esteem of individu-
als, due to the fact that their particular traits 
status, to ‘modern legal relations’, whereby rights are detached from social roles and (theoretically 
at least) given to all human beings as free individuals, making modern legal relations less hier-
archical and more equal and universal. For Honneth, this process marks the historical juncture 
at which two aspects of respect are clearly discernible due to the uncoupling of legal recognition 
from social esteem (Honneth 1996; 107–121).
31 For Honneth, this process is due to the way in which the ‘institutionalisation of bourgeois lib-
erties’ set in motion a moral guiding principle that throughout history has been redeemed by 
disadvantaged groups who have demonstrated that their conditions are not adequate for full and 
equal participation in the rational will-formation of the current political community.
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and abilities are judged according to how they 
contribute to the culturally defined goals of a 
society. Thus: 
The more conceptions of ethical goals are open 
to different values and the more their hierarchi-
cal arrangement gives way to horizontal com-
petition, the more clearly social esteem will be 
able to take on an individualising character and 
generate symmetrical relationships. (ibid.; 122)
For Honneth, social esteem in contem-
porary societies is accorded to individuals as 
individuated beings rather than as a member 
of a particular social group.32 The differences 
in relation to others, that allow one to feel 
‘valuable’, are no longer defined collectivistically 
but rather individualistically, and according to 
the traits that individuals develop along with 
the evaluation of these traits in terms of the 
realisation of societal goals. The social worth 
accorded ‘societal value-ideas’ comes to depend 
upon the ruling interpretations of societal goals, 
which in turn depends upon the dominance of 
particular social groups in having their forms of 
life publicly recognised as valuable. It is in this 
sense that Honneth considers relations of social 
esteem to be subject to cultural struggle.
Whereas the practical-relation-to-self expe- 
r ienced through status groups in corporatively 
organised societies can be considered in terms 
of collective honour, the practical-relation-to-
self experienced after the individualisation of 
this form of recognition is seen by Honneth 
as ‘self-esteem’. ‘Self-esteem’ now becomes 
a parallel concept with ‘self-confidence’ and 
‘self-respect’ for Honneth, and he looks forward 
to the ‘social relations of symmetrical esteem 
between individualised (and autonomous sub-
jects)’ which would lead to a ‘state of societal 
solidarity’, whereby all members of society are 
able to esteem themselves (ibid.; 129).33 This 
‘symmetricality’ of esteem cannot be identi-
32 This recognition relation has also undergone a historical transformation, according to Honneth 
(1996; 121–130), marked by the transition from pre-modern notions of ‘honour’ to modern cat-
egories of ‘social standing’ or ‘prestige’. In pre-modern, ‘corporatively organised societies’, ethical 
goals are organised hierarchically according to their contribution to the achievement of certain 
societal values, and individuals attain ‘honour’ by participating in behaviour which is collectively 
expected of their social status. Honneth sees the decline of traditional ethical life as being due to a 
transformation in the cultural self-understanding of a society, from one largely still dependent on 
religious and metaphysical presuppositions to one that recognised ‘ethical obligations’ as inner-
worldly decisions’ (ibid.; 124). This also led to the bourgeoisie’s confrontation with the nobility 
over notions of honour and conduct in accordance with one’s ‘estate’; a confrontation that not 
only established new value-principles but also questioned the very status of such value-principles.
33 Honneth predominantly argues that solidarity is made up of the societal recognition accorded us 
through our contribution to society in the form of organised labour, and ‘the chances of forming 
an individual identity through the experience of recognition are directly related to the societal 
institutionalisation and distribution of labour’ (Honneth 2007; 76). A key example that Hon-
neth feels exemplifies this issue is the feminist discussion around unpaid societal labour, in the 
form of childcare and housework, in the context of patriarchal cultural values. However, although 
he wants to emphasise the link, severed by Habermas, between work and moral experience, he 
also wants to avoid reintroducing the role of ‘emancipatory consciousness formation’ assigned to 
labour in Marxist philosophies of history. 
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fied in quantitative terms but rather refers to 
a state where ‘every subject is free from being 
collectively denigrated, so that one is given the 
chance to experience oneself to be recognised, 
in light of one’s own accomplishments and abil-
ities, as valuable for society’ (ibid.; 130).34 The 
final form of disrespect that Honneth outlines 
here is therefore concerned with ‘the denigra-
tion of individual and collective ways of life’. 
If an individual’s status is dependent upon the 
collective esteem accorded to their approach 
to self-realisation within society’s cultural value 
system, then a cultural system that denigrates 
certain individual forms of life prevents the sub-
ject from socially valuing their own particular 
traits and abilities. This in turn creates a loss of 
personal self-esteem for the individual.35
Having sketched out the broad outlines of 
the three forms of recognition – with their dif-
fering media of recognition, forms of relation-
to-self, accompanying forms of disrespect as well 
as potential for moral development – Honneth 
now suggests that two conclusions can be 
drawn here. Firstly, we should be able to iden-
tify ‘symptoms’ of social disrespect that make 
subjects aware of the state they are in, such as 
the ‘negative emotional reactions expressed in 
feelings of social shame’ (ibid.; 135), and how 
these emotional reactions can translate into 
struggles for recognition and forms of political 
resistance.36 Here he also explores the (flawed) 
‘traces of a tradition’ in the social philosophy 
of Marx, Georges Sorel and Jean-Paul Sartre, 
as well as some historical research on polit-
ical movements which exposes the normative, 
rather than utilitarian, motives for resistance.37 
Secondly, by obtaining an overview of the dif-
ferent forms of disrespect, a positive sense of 
34 However, of course, this begs the question of how to conceive of a post-traditional ethical life, i.e. 
one that accepts the loss of a substantive cultural consensus under conditions of social modernity 
and individualisation. Once recognition relations are increasingly individualised, then how are we 
to understand the recognition of individuals in their difference and specificity? And how are we 
to conceive of the cultural consensus which might recognise the individual contributions towards 
shared societal goals? Honneth (2011; 406–407) has since criticised his conception of esteem 
here for giving the false impression of the possibility of a normative consensus in times of ethical 
pluralism; he opts instead for the possibility of agreement on ‘constitutional principles’ rather 
than ‘ethical values’. 
35 Honneth elaborates on this point in his ‘Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation: John Dewey and 
the Theory of Democracy Today’ in Honneth (2007).
36 Utilising John Dewey’s idea that emotions are a response to frustrated actions, Honneth argues 
that the failure to meet one’s expectations in normative action leads to moral conflicts, and also 
that negative emotional reactions are therefore seen as a response to the violation of normative 
expectations. Honneth argues that the likelihood of the moral knowledge, implicit in experiences 
of disrespect, becoming political resistance is dependent on the subject’s cultural-political context: 
‘only if the means of articulation of a social movement are available can the experience of disre-
spect become a source of motivation for acts of political resistance’ (1996; 139). However, he also 
acknowledges that there are no guarantees that ‘the normative direction of its critique is shared by 
the victims of disrespect’ (2007; 78). 
37 He particularly relies on the work of E. P. Thompson (1963) and Barrington Moore, Jr., (1978). 
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what constitutes ‘psychological health’ can be 
identified, along with the ‘social guarantees 
associated with those relations of recognition 
that are able to protect subjects most extensively 
from suffering disrespect’ (ibid.).
A Formal Conception of Ethical Life
Honneth takes the ‘intersubjective cond i- 
tions for personal integrity’ to be the ‘presup- 
positions for individual self-realisation’, and 
wants to extend his conception of social conflict 
from being a framework for explaining social 
struggles to being part of a wider process of 
moral formation. The important role played 
by social struggles in the logic of recognition 
re lations means that they can be evaluated in 
terms of the moral progress in the historical 
development of society. However, to be able 
to make such judgements, Honneth seeks 
to identify a normative standard point from 
which to outline the developmental direction 
of moral progress. Starting with the tripartite 
distinction between love, rights and solidarity, 
and acknowledging the distinction itself as a his-
torical product, Honneth imagines a past where 
‘the existence of an archaic group morality, in 
which aspects of care are not fully separated 
from either the rights of tribal members or their 
social esteem’ (1996; 169). The function of this 
speculative projection is to determine the moral 
learning process as one that both differentiates 
between the different forms of recognition, and 
also unleashes the normative potential inherent 
in each. He argues that these developmental 
normative potentials are identifiable in experi-
ences of disrespect, and can be appealed to in the 
struggles arising out of such experiences. With 
this general logic of the expansion of recognition 
relations in place, Honneth seeks to outline the 
idealised developmental path that would allow 
for the evaluation of particular struggles in 
terms of their positive or negative contribution 
towards the goal of undistorted recognition.38 
Accepting the necessarily hypothetical nature 
of such a task, Honneth thereby sets out to 
contemporise Hegel’s ‘formal conception of 
ethical life’.
Honneth is dissatisfied with what he sees 
as the dominant, Kantian, philosophical posi-
tion on morality which, by insisting merely 
that all subjects be justly given equal respect, 
is unable to incorporate all elements necessary 
for undistorted recognition relations. He is 
He emphasises ‘the internal connection that often holds between the emergence of social move-
ments and the moral experience of disrespect’ and seeks to delineate ‘a concept of social struggle 
that takes as its starting-point moral feelings of indignation, rather than pre-given interests’ 
(1996; 161). Thompson is particularly useful inasmuch as he looks at the moral context of the 
resistance of the lower classes to capitalist industrialisation and points out that social resistance 
cannot be simply an expression of economic deprivation as ‘what counts as an unbearable level of 
economic provision is to be measured in terms of the moral expectations that people consensually 
bring to the organisation of the community’ (ibid.; 166).
38 In his debate with Nancy Fraser (in Fraser and Honneth 2003), Honneth has extended this point 
with recourse to a notion of ‘validity surplus’ at work in the three forms of recognition. See also 
Honneth’s ‘Recognition as Ideology’ in Honneth (2012).
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more ambitious in his attempt to outline the 
necessary conditions for a ‘good’ rather than a 
merely ‘just’ life, and these conditions would 
include universal respect as one, but not the 
only, important factor. Honneth’s conception 
is instead concerned with the self-realisation 
of human beings in addition to their moral 
autonomy.39 However, he insists that:
in contrast to those movements that distance 
themselves from Kant, this concept of the good 
should not be conceived as the expression of 
substantive values that constitute the ethos of a 
concrete tradition-based community. Rather, it 
has to do with the structural elements of ethical 
life, which, from the general point of view of the 
communicative enabling of self-realisation, can 
be normatively extracted from the plurality of all 
particular forms of life. (ibid.; 172)
Similarly to Habermas and his notion of 
‘discourse ethics’ then, what Honneth wants to 
do here is place himself in the middle of Kantian 
moral theory and communitarian ethics,40 by 
championing the former’s emphasis on general 
norms, while insisting on the importance of 
the latter’s emphasis on human self-realisation. 
Honneth justifies the three forms of recognition 
as necessary conditions for a successful life by 
suggesting that it is impossible to imagine suc-
cessful self-realisation – understood as having 
the freedom to achieve one’s chosen goals  – 
without self-confidence, legally guaranteed 
autonomy, and affirmation of the value of 
one’s abilities. On the one hand, Honneth now 
considers the three forms of recognition, which 
are also necessary conditions for self-realisation, 
as ‘formal or abstract enough not to raise the 
suspicion of representing merely the deposits 
of concrete interpretations of the good life’ 
(ibid.; 173), i.e. they are generalised enough to 
be applicable to all particular forms of life. On 
the other hand, he argues that there is sufficient 
detail here ‘to be of more help than Kantian 
references to individual autonomy in discover-
ing the conditions for self-realisation’ (ibid.).
In fleshing out what this might mean, 
Honneth seeks to provide an outline of what a 
‘post-traditional ethical life’ might look like. He 
argues that the basic structure of ‘love’ – which 
‘represents the innermost core of all forms of 
life that qualify as “ethical”’ and is the necessary 
precursor for other types of self-realisation in 
that it allows individuals to express their needs 
and will remain the same in post-traditional 
ethical life – is restricted in its openness to nor- 
mative development (ibid.; 176).41 However, 
the sphere of rights in post-traditional ethical 
life allows for the extension of rights equally to 
39 In many ways, Honneth’s emphasis on a recognitive account of autonomy and self-realisation 
follows the attempt to move beyond the liberal notion of justice made by Hegel in his Philosophy 
of Right. Honneth explores this in more depth in his Spinoza lectures, published as Suffering from 
Indeterminacy: An Attempt at a Reactualisation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (2001) and repub-
lished in Honneth (2010).
40 See Habermas (1990, 1994). 
41 Honneth has since revisited the claim that love is exempt from the possibility of normative de-
velopment in Fraser and Honneth (2003). Here he acknowledges that love can only be conceived 
as a recognition relation necessary for self-confidence once the family as a private sphere, and 
‘childhood’ as a distinct phase, has emerged historically.
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more people (universalisation), whilst also devel-
oping beyond liberal civil rights and becoming 
more sensitive to individual circumstances (de- 
formalisation). The legal sphere is increasingly 
able to accommodate the fact that there are cer-
tain prerequisites allowing individuals to enjoy 
the liberties that come with civil rights, whilst 
not sacrificing their universal quality. With 
regard to the recognition relation of ‘solidarity’, 
he also sees a process of individualisation along-
side ‘equalisation in communities of value’, and 
suggests that: 
social-structural upheavals in developed socie-
ties have so greatly expanded the possibilities for 
self-realisation that the experience of individual 
or collective difference has become the impetus 
for a whole series of political movements. In the 
long run, their demands can only be satisfied 
once culture has been transformed so as to radi-
cally expand relations of solidarity. (ibid.; 179)
Honneth makes a compelling case here for 
the centrality of recognition and disrespect in 
our struggles for equality and justice, and for 
the ways in which our ego development and 
personal identities are formed through recog-
nition relations and are therefore, implicitly 
and intuitively, damaged by a discernible lack 
of recognition in the realms of love, law, and 
solidarity. There is also a lot I find convincing 
in his claim that incomplete identity formation, 
in response to incomplete forms of societal re- 
cognition, produces negative feelings of shame 
and indignation which educate us about the 
lack of recognition, and produce the possibility 
of individual and collective struggles for more 
complete and inclusive forms of societal recog-
nition and moral development. One advantage 
here is that this broad theoretical framework 
avoids a reductionist class-based analysis of 
social injustice, whilst being able to conceive 
of class struggle in ‘recognitive’ terms alongside 
other, and often intersecting, forms of injustice 
and struggle along the lines of gender, race and 
sexuality. Another advantage, as we have seen, is 
that it also makes stronger links than Habermas 
does between the normative presuppositions 
of social interaction and the moral feelings of 
social actors, providing a stronger link between 
aspects of everyday experiences and a ‘critical-
theoretical’ standpoint with concrete emancipa-
tory possibilities. However, I take issue below 
with signs of abstraction and proceduralism in 
Honneth’s ‘formal’ conception of ethical life, 
which can he believes strengthen his critical-
theoretical standpoint insofar as the three forms 
of recognition are to be seen as universal and 
necessary conditions for self-realisation – both 
sufficiently substantive yet ‘formal’ enough to 
be applicable to all particular forms of life. I also 
challenge the way in which Honneth conceives 
of the process and possibility of recognition – 
what it is that we recognise about the other and 
about ourselves in this process, and the extent 
to which established recognition-relations and 
institutions are able to satisfy what it is we seek 
recognition for.
(Mis)Recognition in Honneth’s  
Recognitive Turn
In his later work, Reification (2008), Hon-
neth still maintains his earlier categorisation 
of recognition relations in terms of love, law 
and solidarity – and the formal conception 
of ethical life they imply – but he deepens 
the centrality of recognition even further 
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by arguing that underlying these normative 
forms of recognition there is an ‘existential’ 
(and transcendental) level of recognition. This 
‘affective’ level of recognition, where we ‘feel 
existential sympathy for the other’ (2008; 152), 
is described as a primary mode of relating to 
the world which colours all of our future hu-
man relations, and provides a foundation on 
which other recognition relations are built. 
In order to be able to engage in other forms 
of recognition relations, we must already have 
affirmed our interaction partners in some way, 
and this affirmation is a form of recognition 
which involves empathetic engagement. In this 
light, ‘reification’ can be seen as an extension 
of the forms of disrespect outlined above, and 
for Honneth it becomes a ‘forgetting’ of our 
primordial recognitive praxis such that our 
cognitive, detached, and spectator-like ap-
proaches to the world – and our tendency to 
instrumentalise others, ourselves and our en-
vironment – forget that they are underwritten 
by a pre-cognitive, affective engagement with 
others, ourselves and the world. In his attempt 
to explore the idea that ‘recognition precedes 
cognition’, Honneth makes reference to a 
number of similar ideas including John Dewey’s 
‘practical involvement’, Stanley Cavell’s ‘ac-
knowledgement’, Martin Heidegger’s ‘care’, 
Adorno’s ‘mimesis’, and Lukács’s ‘engaged 
praxis’. He describes reification as ‘an atrophied 
or distorted form of a more primordial and 
genuine form of praxis, in which humans take 
up an active and involved relationship toward 
themselves and their surroundings’ (ibid.; 27), 
and he emphasises ‘the notion that the stance 
of empathetic engagement in the world, arising 
from the experience of the world’s significance 
and value [Werthaftigkeit], is prior to our acts 
of detached cognition’ (ibid.; 38).
A number of critics have questioned Hon-
neth’s tendency here and in his earlier work to 
single out ‘recognition’ as the underlying source 
of all forms of injustice and suffering here. Ales-
sandro Ferrara (2011) and Christopher Zurn 
(2011), for example, mainly criticise Honneth 
for relying on a monocausal account of social 
pathologies that operates with a grand narrative 
and reduces all injustices and pathologies to the 
realm of recognition.42 Instead they suggest that 
a more multi-dimensional approach would be 
more effective at addressing the specificities of 
particular pathologies, something Zurn be-
lieves Honneth is attempting to do in his more 
recent work on organised self-realisation and 
the paradoxes of capitalism.43 A key critic of 
42 Zurn (2011; 346) also argues that Honneth’s ‘socio-theoretic explanations’ for reification and 
forgetting are inconclusive, and we are left wondering whether the social causes of reification 
are ‘ineliminable features of human life’ or ‘socio-culturally specific forms of pathology that are 
amenable to amelioration or eradication through the transformations of current social structures, 
institutions and practices’ (ibid.; 357–358). Ferrara’s analysis of Honneth’s Reification criticises the 
implication in Honneth’s work that the different forms of reification (in terms of what Ferrara calls 
‘technical fetishism’, ‘misrecognition’ and ‘inauthenticity’) share the same social causes, rather than 
developing out of differential processes. For Honneth’s response see Honneth (2011; 419).
43 See Honneth (2004) and Hartmann & Honneth (2006), both of which are republished in Hon-
neth (2012).
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Honneth here is Nancy Fraser whose exchange 
with Honneth in their Redistribution or Recog- 
nition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange (2003) 
centres around the difference between her du-
alistic approach to injustice (recognition and 
redistribution) and his monistic approach (re- 
cognition). Fraser claims that an approach based 
solely on recognition tends to miss important 
aspects of economic equality and she therefore 
sets up an analytical distinction between in-
justice premised on the lack of economic and 
political resources and injustice resulting from 
the lack of social and cultural recognition of 
one’s identity.44 Beyond both ‘culturalism’ and 
‘economism’, she sets herself the task of outlin-
ing what a society might look like where all its 
members are accorded participatory parity and 
the equal opportunity to lead an autonomous 
life; for her this includes the importance of both 
distributive and recognitive goods. Honneth on 
the other hand, according to Fraser, reduces all 
struggles and injustice to a core of recognition 
(supplemented with moral psychology) and 
seeks to provide an excessively strong notion 
of the good life in the form of ‘self-realisation’, 
rather than the more formal account of ‘parity’ 
which Fraser believes to be more appropriate in 
modern, pluralist societies.
In response to this, Honneth suggests that 
his notion of recognition is sufficiently robust to 
cover economic and political injustices in addi-
tion to cultural recognition, for example he sees 
struggles over redistribution as being centrally 
concerned with how we ‘recognise’ different 
types of labour and economic contribution; 
he finds the more justice-based approaches, 
such as Fraser’s, as overly formal and lacking in 
substance. Honneth refers to the ‘achievement 
principle’ and the notion of ‘equal respect’ as 
examples that demonstrate the way in which 
the capitalist economy is rooted in a broader 
normative context, and displays symptoms of 
‘asymmetrical forms of recognition’. He sug-
gests that although these principles have served 
ideological purposes (i.e. justifying wealth 
inequalities in capitalism), they have also been 
used to support welfare distribution, and used 
as tools by worker’s movements, women and 
other groups to challenge inequalities and gain 
recognition for societal contribution.
However, it is not Honneth’s exclusive 
focus on recognition as the source of all forms 
of injustice and suffering that I believe to be of 
particular concern in Honneth’s reconfigured 
critical theory,45 but instead the tendency to 
idealise the notion of recognition, his lack of 
44 It is worth noting that Fraser has now developed an updated three-dimensional rather than dual-
istic approach (see Fraser 2005). For her original conception of injustice in terms of recognition/
redistribution, see her New Left Review article (Fraser 1995).
45 I tend to broadly agree with Honneth and the other critics of Fraser in this debate, who have not 
only contested Fraser’s tendency to separate out a sphere of the economy (driven solely by the 
maximisation of profit) from the ‘social limits on markets’ set by laws and forms of cultural eval-
uation (see Honneth in Fraser and Honneth 2003; 256), but also questioned the redistribution/
recognition division, and demonstrated that her own theory of participatory parity, in outlining 
the necessary conditions for social participation, is ‘already a theory of recognition and misrecog-
nition’ (Bernstein 2005; 310). There is also a clear tension here with Fraser’s earlier criticism of 
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an adequate conception of misrecognition, his 
neglect of the ideological role that recognition 
often plays, and the abstraction at work in his 
‘formal’ conception of ethical life. I will now 
outline these criticisms in turn.
Idealising Recognition
Some of the critics of Honneth’s work, par-
ticularly his recent work on reification, tend to 
bring a number of these key criticisms together. 
Despite their differences, all seek to question the 
idealised notion of mutual recognition at work 
in his notion of (precognitive) empathetic en-
gagement.46 Judith Butler questions Honneth’s 
tendency to idealise a notion of empathetic 
engagement and to neglect the ‘negative’ aspects 
of what this engagement often involves (e.g. 
hate, sadism, aggression etc.). She suggests that: 
if a normative value is to be derived from in-
volvement, it is not because involvement presup-
poses a normative structure of genuine praxis, 
but because we are beings who have to struggle 
with both love and aggression in our flawed and 
commendable efforts to care for other human 
beings. [...] It is not a matter of returning to 
what we ‘really’ know or undoing our deviations 
from the norm, but of struggling with a set of 
ethical demands on the basis of myriad affective 
responses that, prior to their expression in ac-
tion, have no particular moral valence. (Butler 
2008; 104) 
Butler also suggests that ‘there is no innate 
moral trajectory in involvement, participation 
and emotionality, since we are beings who, from 
the start, both love and resist our dependency, 
and whose psychic reality is, by definition, 
ambivalent’ (ibid.; 106). Jonathan Lear makes 
a similar point and also argues that Honneth’s 
account assumes the narrative structure of ‘the 
fall’ with the concomitant tendency to ‘build 
too much goodness into the prior condition’ 
(Lear 2008; 132, 139).
Roger Foster (2011) develops these ideas 
further and argues that rather than being 
a primal layer of social interaction as such, 
recognition is a ‘dynamic process’ driven by 
an ‘existential ambiguity’ – the fact that ‘we 
both want and need recognition, and we fear 
and refuse it, and neither of these tendencies is 
more primordial than the other’ (ibid.; 257). 
Foster goes some way towards explaining this 
ambiguity by suggesting that recognition both 
humanises us but at the same time leaves us feel-
ing ‘exposed, dependent, injurable, and mortal’ 
(ibid.); he argues that ‘we are (have become) 
selves that are invested in this refusal of recog-
nition; it is the continually re-enacted work of 
denial by the self for whom the exposure to the 
other is experienced as a source of fear’ (ibid.; 
263). So rather than following Honneth in his 
account of reification, whereby the ‘forgetting’ 
of recognition is akin to amnesia or ‘reduced 
attentiveness’, we might be more convinced by 
Foster’s more Freudian, psycho-social concep-
tion whereby our involvement with others ‘is 
instead actively, and continually, repressed’ 
Habermas’s distinction between system and social integration. For notable criticisms of Fraser’s 
recognition/redistribution distinction see Butler (1998), and Fraser’s response to Butler (in Fraser 
1998), Young (1997) and Fraser’s response to Young (in Fraser 1997), Philips (1997), Bernstein 
(2005), and Smith (2011; 335–336).
46 For Honneth’s response to the critics of his Reification book, see his ‘Rejoinder’ in Honneth 
(2008).
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(ibid.; 260). By exploring the relationship 
between reification, subject-formation and 
cognitive activity, Foster suggests an Adornian 
conception of ‘movement, or better, struggle, 
towards self-awareness within cognition itself ’ 
(ibid.), whereby our empathy is enlivened by 
acknowledging ‘our own self-disfigurement in 
so far as we have become the type of subjects 
who are able to function in a way that enforces 
the dominance of the neutralised point of view’ 
(ibid.; 260–261). This way the recovery of 
such recognition underlying reification would 
involve the subject becoming aware of the way 
its own self has been damaged by reified forms of 
thinking. Here Foster refers to the importance 
of ‘transformative experiences’ and, following 
Cavell and Adorno, places a special emphasis 
on the de-reifying role of aesthetics.47
Mis-Recognising
In addition to these criticisms of Hon-
neth for idealising recognition, I also wish to 
question the curious absence of a notion of 
misrecognition in Honneth’s work as a whole. 
As Foster suggests, recognition ‘is possible only 
by working through our inevitable tendency to 
misrecognise the object’ or other (2011; 258), 
and to ‘deny, repudiate, and refuse the voice of 
the other’ (ibid.; 256) in the process. Instead 
Honneth gives the impression that recognition 
is a fixed and constant factor underlying social 
life and is characterised by positive relations 
to the self and other. What this misses out is 
the fact that ‘recognition is a process that is 
conflictual and involves struggle, both within 
the self and between self and others, [and] its 
realization must encompass a movement of 
self-transformation’ (ibid.; 258).48 Without an 
account of how we attempt to recognise others, 
fail to do so, and transform our self-conception 
in the process, Honneth is unable to do justice 
to the importance of recognition in our collec-
tive lives. Along similar lines, Peter Osborne 
(1996) criticises Honneth’s use of ‘recognition’ 
for the tendency to separate out the social as-
pect, whereby individuals or groups are assigned 
a certain status, from epistemological issues, i.e. 
how we come to know the other, and what we 
come to know about them. It is for this reason 
that the opposite of recognition for Honneth 
is ‘disrespect’ rather than ‘misrecognition’. In 
other words, it tends to be the phenomenological 
aspects of Hegel’s notion of recognition that are 
missing in Honneth’s work, including the no-
tion of desire which is at the heart of the struggle 
for recognition for Hegel.49
47 I agree  with Foster on these points and pursue these ideas further in Hazeldine (2015).
48 Robert Sinnerbrink (2011) makes a similar point here in relation to the loss of a notion of 
‘struggle’ in Honneth’s work. He argues that despite Honneth’s earlier engagement with Foucault, 
due to the advantages of a notion of power and struggle he sees missing in Habermas’s work, 
Honneth in fact ends up losing sight of the importance of struggle in his own account of recog - 
n ition. Sinnerbrink argues that the emphasis on morality rather than the politics of recognition 
in Honneth’s later work also leads to the abandonment, or at least the neglect, of the importance 
of an action-theoretic model of the social.
49 Again, an idea I pursue further in Hazeldine (2015) but have insufficient space to elaborate on 
here.
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By neglecting the importance of misrecog- 
n ition, we might also want to ask some difficult 
questions about which identities are recognised, 
along with which aspects of our identities, 
and whether the simple recognition of these 
identities necessarily constitutes a step forward 
in terms of emancipatory politics. Despite his 
earlier appropriation of Foucault’s work for 
example, Honneth tends to miss or at least 
downplay the point that, as subjects, we tend 
to be formed partly through our subjection to 
particular power relations, and therefore the 
affirmation (or ‘recognition’) of one’s identity 
or cultural specificity may well serve to affirm 
certain (socio-economic) power relations. 
Emmanuel Renault (2011), for example, 
criticises Honneth’s account of recognition for 
being predominantly ‘expressivist’ rather than 
‘constitutive’. What he means by this is that 
Honneth tends to understand social institu-
tions as ‘expressions’ of underlying recognition 
relations, and tends to focus exclusively on the 
way in which recognition relations transform 
these institutions. What gets lost in this ac-
count, according to Renault, is the way in which 
social institutions both form and restrict – or 
‘constitute’ – subjects, and also pervert certain 
moral claims; there is an absence of a notion of 
‘subjectivisation’ in the Foucauldian sense of 
becoming ‘subject’ to particular institutional 
discourses.50 By neglecting, or not fully ap-
preciating, the importance of this institutional 
level, Renault suggests that Honneth misses 
the complexity of struggles for recognition, e.g. 
the ways in which institutions are evaluated ac-
cording to people’s ‘already constituted (social 
and professional) identities’, rather than simply 
through the lens of self-confidence, self-respect 
and self-esteem, or the ways in which,
groups can use institutional recognition models 
either as a central claim (for instance when mi-
norities struggle for alleged universal rights), or 
as merely strategic means (for example, when a 
group calls for more cultural recognition as the 
only way to benefit from more economical inte-
gration). (Renault 2011; 228–229)
Related to this is the argument that we 
might consider genuine cultural critique to 
be neutralised within the public sphere of late 
capitalism and that ‘by converting cultural 
opposition into claims to the affirmation of 
cultural particularity, the link is effectively bro-
ken between oppression and the reproduction 
of socio-economic structures – that is to say, 
between “cultural” exclusion and material exclu-
sion’ (Foster 1999; 12). This criticism directly 
relates to the tendency in Honneth to perceive 
claims to recognition as ‘identity’ claims. Foster 
argues that this runs the risk of affirming the 
notion of a fixed (and private) identity, as a 
‘victim’ that merely needs to be protected by law, 
rather than allowing for the possibility of a trans-
formative identity, e.g. the difference between 
affirmative gay rights and more transformative 
queer politics. Osborne (1996) makes a similar 
point and criticises Honneth for both lacking 
a sense of how cultural forms already mediate 
the process of recognition and for focussing on 
the legal recognition of identity-claims rather 
50 In his response to this criticism Honneth suggests that we might see the relationship between 
institutions and recognition as one marked by ‘co-evolution’ (Honneth 2011; 403–404). 
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than more complex ‘social forms of subjectivity’. 
He argues that Honneth idealises the formal 
universality of legal recognition and thereby 
‘abstracts from the existence of the state with 
its “class- [and, we might add, gender- and 
race-] specific implementation” of the law; not 
to mention the specificity of state forms in dif-
ferent social formations’ (ibid.; 36). Osborne 
also suggests that we pay significant attention to 
what we might call ‘injuries of recognition’, and 
the ways in which the law actually forms certain 
identities through exclusion, rather than simply 
focusing on how we might go about recognising 
already existing identity claims.51
Recognition as Ideology
In further support of the above arguments, I 
also want to draw further attention to the ways 
in which what appears as successful recognition 
can be the result of the attempt by dominant 
interests to undermine emancipatory possibili-
ties. Foster gives the example of the recognition 
of trade unions, as the ‘legal subjectivity of the 
working class’, and the way the recognition 
of certain freedoms (e.g. to strike) paralleled 
certain administrative procedures (e.g. collec-
tive bargaining) that sought to undermine class 
conflict by establishing unions as mediators 
between workers and the state (Foster 1999). 
Jay Bernstein makes a similar point in terms 
of ‘idealising identification’ when he suggests 
that ‘it is recognising wage labourers as free and 
equal that secures their domination; just as it is 
recognising the table as worth a hundred dol-
lars that secures its fetish character’ (Bernstein 
2005; 318). Here Bernstein defends Marx’s 
(dialectical) critique of rights: ‘that rights as they 
now are preserve the very lack their possession 
promises – the right to vote as a continuation 
of disenfranchisement, the right to welfare as 
a way of keeping people impoverished’ (ibid.; 
324). Instead, our notions of injustice ‘must 
exceed ideal, established justice because justice’s 
mechanisms of recognition till now simulta- 
neously systematically misrecognise’ (ibid.; 
318). So not only does Honneth have to be 
more sensitive to the ways in which recogni-
tion is a fragile and ambiguous process, as well 
as a threat to self-identity and therefore often 
actively avoided, but he also has to make sense of 
the struggles that take place over what it is that 
is being ‘recognised’, and the often exclusionary 
practices of established forms of recognition.
Another point of contention is the tendency 
for Honneth to operate with an idealised no-
tion of cultural autonomy that assumes that 
individual experiences of disrespect are (directly) 
translatable into group experiences, which 
51 A similar point is forwarded by Jacques Rancière in his exchange with Honneth (Rancière 2016). 
Honneth goes some way towards tackling some of these criticisms in his ‘Recognition as Ideology’ 
essay (2012), where he seeks to distinguish between ideological forms of recognition (e.g. the re- 
cognition of a housewife for her cleaning skills, the recognition of a slave for his subservience etc.) 
and ‘socially productive’ forms. He suggests that the former are characterised by a gap between 
what they promise and the material and institutional context within which that promise can be 
fulfilled. He also suggests here that we might want to distinguish between ‘recognition orders’ 
that primarily end up affirming forms of domination, and those that create new identities and 
extend the scope of our normative claims.
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are then channelled into collective resistance 
without the intervening impact of a liberal 
ideology (and liberal culture) encouraging us 
to understand our fate in individualistic terms. 
Honneth in other words lacks a sufficient ac-
count of how power and ideology thwart the 
emancipatory possibilities of struggles for re- 
cognition. Foster (1999) suggests that although 
Honneth is correct to question the tendency of 
earlier Critical Theory to see culture as serving 
an ideological and socialising function, he does 
not sufficiently explore to what extent con-
temporary culture can ‘serve as the focal point 
for resistance against dominant norms’ (ibid.; 
11), or the ways in which individual and col-
lective action ‘occur under conditions of severe 
structural constraint and the ubiquitous (but 
in no sense all-powerful and all-determining) 
operation of liberal ideology’ (ibid.; 13). Foster 
argues that often we see how ‘the potential of 
cultural resistance gets stuck between the “rock” 
of a neutralising assimilation to dominant inter-
pretations of liberal individualism and the “hard 
place” of an outright rejection of the dominant 
value system’ (1999; 11).
In other words, forms of social and eco-
nomic exclusion may well result in the inver-
sion of dominant values and the redefinition of 
‘respect’ in counter-cultural terms. Although 
Honneth takes this point on board and responds 
with the hope that a ‘moral culture’ will give 
those suffering from ‘disrespect’ the ‘individual 
strength to articulate their experiences in the 
democratic public sphere’, Foster suggests that 
this demonstrates an overly optimistic and 
idealised faith in the democratic public sphere, 
and thereby ‘overlooks the extent to which op-
positional subcultures can be understood as a 
reaction to patterns of social exclusion whose 
very existence is denied within the democratic 
public sphere itself ’ (ibid.; 12). He argues that 
Honneth neglects the way in which participa-
tion in the public sphere tends to require groups 
to adhere to the demands of a liberal-individual 
ideology which in turn neutralises resistance and 
reproduces structures of domination. Following 
Foster then, and in the light of our criticisms so 
far, we might ask whether it might be the case 
‘that normative claims emerge through forms 
of struggle which a liberal-communitarian 
structuring of the conditions of self-realisation 
proves unable to satisfy’ (ibid.; 10).52
Questioning a ‘Formal’ Conception of 
Ethical Life?
The final set of criticisms which are of 
importance for the thrust of my argument, 
concern the problems with Honneth’s ‘formal 
52 We might also criticise Honneth’s account for seeing social and political institutions as ‘conditions 
for the formation of self-consciousness’, whereby such institutions, in the light of struggles for 
recognition, are slowly transformed into conditions adequate for a positive relation to self. This 
poses the danger that we see politics, and moral progress, through the lens of (individual) self-
relations, such that ethical life is reduced to providing the intersubjective context for (individual) 
self-realisation; we end up instrumentalising politics and turning cooperation and ethical life into 
the means for our private ends (see Bernstein 2005; 304). We thereby lose the relational aspect of 
recognition which is concerned with, amongst other things, the destabilising of identity through 
communal relations, and also the destabilising of current communal relations.
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conception of ethical life’. At the heart of 
these criticisms is both the question of the ap-
propriateness of Honneth’s conception in the 
context of pluralist societies, and the tendency 
for Honneth to follow Habermas in formalis-
ing and purifying practical norms. Max Pensky 
(2011) and Bert van den Brink (2011) focus 
their criticisms of Honneth on the notions of 
‘ethical life’ and ‘solidarity’, and at the heart of 
their critique is the tension, or rather irreconcil-
ability, between a formal conception of ethical 
life and the pluralism of modern societies. They 
argue that our modern, ethically pluralist, so-
cieties are unlikely to agree upon the kind of 
common idea of the good life that Honneth 
believes is necessary to provide the recognition 
(and esteem) of individuals in their particular-
ity. They remain unconvinced by Honneth’s 
attempt to mediate between abstract, formal 
accounts of solidarity on the one hand, and 
substantive, but often exclusive, accounts of 
solidarity on the other (see Pensky 2011; 148). 
In the light of their comments, it is hard to 
see how Honneth takes us beyond either the 
Rawlsian account of an overlapping consensus 
in terms of broad agreements about how we 
disagree, or Habermas’s account of the solidary 
effects of communicative rationality. We are left 
with the dilemma of broad, yet inclusive, social 
goals that are too formal to produce solidarity 
(i.e. notions of procedural justice and public 
reason), or a substantive version of ethical life 
which risks forms of denigration and exclu-
sion. Pensky suggests that Honneth’s ‘formal’ 
conception of ethical life tends to side with the 
former and therefore lacks a true sense of the 
‘ethical, in the sense of describing a sphere of 
interpretations of the kind of life desirable for 
us’ (ibid.; 152).
Bert van den Brink also suggests that a 
formal conception of ethical life is incoher-
ent and that Honneth’s conception of ethical 
life should be conceived as ‘one substantive 
account of ethical life among several, rather 
than the formal account of ethical life for 
post-traditional societies’ (van den Brink 2011; 
160).53 In other words, he suggests that self-
realisation, autonomy and pluralism can be 
seen as substantive values, rather than formal 
ones abstracted from plural versions of the good 
life, and that a solution to the problem might 
take the form of a ‘public dialogue among 
several substantive positions’ (ibid.; 164).54 
Honneth however seems to accept the terms of 
this dilemma and of these criticisms in his later 
work (e.g. see Fraser and Honneth 2003), and 
53 For a similar critique see Owen (2007).
54 In fact, van den Brink goes further in suggesting not only that ‘in a pluralistic world, the best 
we can hope for is that we will mutually respect each other’s life-choices even if we cannot really 
set ourselves to granting them our full esteem’, but also that ‘as long as the mutual respect that is 
implicit in our recognising valid legal relations is warranted, the lack of full esteem and, at times, 
even the mutual devaluation of each other’s convictions need not be a constant threat to our 
wellbeing’. For him, contra Honneth, ‘we make ourselves needlessly vulnerable to the impossi- 
b ility of social harmony if we conceive of ethical life as presupposing undistorted and unrestricted 
relationships of recognition’ (2011; 172).
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suggests that there might be an ‘overlapping 
consensus’ regarding constitutional principles 
but not regarding ethical values. In an attempt 
to avoid this problem Honneth takes what he 
sees as a Durkheimian route and links social 
esteem to ‘the exchange of services’ (as a ‘tran-
scendentally institutionalised medium’), and 
argues that ‘independent of the ethical aims 
that individual members of society might 
pursue, they must share an interest in securing 
the material conditions of their social existence’ 
(2011; 407). Honneth recognises that the way 
different tasks are esteemed relies upon ‘ethi-
cal or cultural background assumptions’, but 
believes that this does not involve ‘competing 
ideas of the good’, and that we can transcend 
such concerns in a more rational and objective 
manner by concentrating on the ‘more “con-
crete” question of which activities are neces-
sary and indispensable for society’s material 
reproduction’ (ibid.; 407–408). However, he 
fails to elaborate on this in any sustained and 
convincing way. The fate of Honneth’s orig-
inal link between self-esteem and individual 
particularity – i.e. those elements of esteem 
attached to individual self-realisation that are 
outside of economic exchange and dependent 
on ethical convictions – is also in many ways 
subsumed back within the sphere of legal re- 
cognition, where the emphasis is on individuals 
being given the autonomy to pursue their own 
particular aims (ibid.; 409).
In many ways, I believe that Honneth’s 
work has been important in broadening the 
communicative perspective, and in developing 
a deeper sense of what binds us together, what 
provides us with a sense of solidarity, and what 
also motivates us to resist forms of injustice 
and suffering. However, despite Honneth’s 
attempts to close the gap between abstract 
rational principles and the (substantive) norms 
of lifeworld practices, I agree with critics such 
as Bernstein (2005) who argue that Honneth 
repeats the tendency in Habermas to ‘purify’ 
the ideals of communicative reason for the 
purpose of distinguishing between progressive 
and regressive societal developments. Ideals (as 
quasi-transcendental principles) – i.e. a ‘formal 
conception of ethical life’ and ‘the general 
presuppositions of communicative action’ – 
become separated from their (empirical) use 
in everyday social practices for the purpose 
of providing a critical yardstick by which to 
assess such practices. In addition to this, there 
is the assumption in Honneth, as in Haber-
mas, that the ‘formal’ nature of such ideals 
is what gives them their ‘rational’ authority. 
Bernstein (2005; 308) argues that the ‘formal’ 
ideals outlined in Habermas and Honneth 
are in many ways part of the problem: despite 
their attempts to ground such ideals in the 
‘pre-theoretical resource’ of social action and 
resistance, they end up turning practical norms 
into ‘theoretical norms’, i.e. the ‘purification’ of 
practical norms robs them of their immanent 
link to motivation and action and they become 
merely contemplative. Despite pointing to this 
in his criticisms of others, Honneth’s ultimate 
emphasis on ‘rights’, as we have seen, tends to 
neglect the fact that they might be implicated 
in forms of ‘misrecognition’, e.g. the tendency 
for legal recognition to be premised on mutual 
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indifference, and to abstract from particular-
ity.55 Therefore, as Bernstein suggests, ‘Hon-
neth’s purification of recognition reiterates 
without shifting the wild hopefulness implied 
by Habermas’s wish to obtain a clean separation 
of instrumental and communicative rationality’ 
(ibid.; 317). Foster also suggests that Honneth 
is guilty of too neatly ‘analytically separating 
the instrumental from the intersubjective’, 
and therefore risks ‘becoming blind to the 
persistence of instrumental attitudes within 
the intersubjective, and to the persistence of 
the intersubjective dimension of our interac-
tion with the non-human world’ (Foster 2011; 
259). Despite Honneth’s desire to bridge the 
gap between abstract rational principles and 
the (substantive) norms of lifeworld practices, 
and to avoid the abstraction and proceduralism 
of Habermas’s ‘idealising presuppositions of 
communication’, Honneth’s ‘formal conception 
of ethical life’ again abstracts from difference, 
particularity, subjectivity, and social – as well 
as material and temporal – context.56 The 
proceduralism apparent in Habermas’s work, 
despite his attempts to escape the confines of 
instrumental rationality, reappears in a new 
form in Honneth’s idealising presuppositions 
of recognition, and again we encounter a ‘uni-
versal’ reason at odds with the claims made by 
desire, the body, nature, and particularity.57 
The Future of Critical Theory: 
Some Concluding Remarks
As we have seen, in many ways Honneth’s 
emphasis on the significance and explanatory 
value of recognitive relations is a critical-theoret-
55 Alexander García Düttman (2000) makes a similar point. In criticising Honneth’s formal con-
ception of ethical life he suggests that the struggle for recognition is determined in advance by 
Honneth’s idealisations, and he argues that there is ‘an essential link between the reification or 
objectification of recognition and an idealisation which has the effect of an ideologisation. It is 
difficult not to conclude that a politics of recognition which is determined by such a link cannot 
but produce and reproduce social conformism’ (ibid.; 156). See also García Düttman (1997). 
56 Signs of an alternative route were apparent in Honneth’s sympathetic engagement with post-
structuralism in his 1994 essay, ‘The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of 
Postmodernism’ (in Honneth 2007). Here, it is Jacques Derrida’s Levinasian-inspired ‘ethics of 
care’ that is seen to surpass Habermas’s discourse ethics in terms of responsibility to the singular 
other. Honneth claims that deconstructive ethics does a better job of incorporating a notion of 
care than what he sees as Habermas’s appeal to an affective ‘solidarity’ between communicative 
partners, because the latter requires us to abstract ourselves from the particularity of our social 
and cultural (and value) communities – where we often experience concrete forms of solidarity – 
in order to find a form of solidarity based on broader shared goals of communication. 
57 Although instrumentally-rational proceduralism, and its concomitant nihilism, is at the heart 
of Adornian (and Habermasian) Critical Theory’s understanding, and critique, of contemporary 
societies, we can argue here that the strong idealising presuppositions at the heart of Habermas’s 
discourse ethics (which seeks to separate out universal norms from ethical values) tend to display 
the purifying and procedural properties of such instrumental rationality. As Bernstein argues, 
‘formalism and proceduralism are themselves the primary criteria that make a form of reason-
ing instrumental [...] communicative reason is a component of the very disintegrative process it 
means to remedy’ (Bernstein 1995; 33). 
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ical improvement on the limitations of Haber-
mas’s theory of communicative action. Honneth 
is right in his Hegelian critique of Habermas’s 
reifying distinction between communicative 
and purposive-rational action spheres, and right 
to question the ‘critical’ and emancipatory pos-
sibilities of Habermas’s appeal to the normative 
presuppositions ‘implicit’ in linguistic under-
standing, and the ways in which this conception 
remains too far removed from the actual (moral) 
experiences of social actors. His alternative, 
recognitive version of critical theory is to be 
credited for its appeal to the violation of iden-
tity claims as ‘an existing experience of social 
injustice,’ and as a pre-theoretical resource for a 
‘critical’ perspective in social reality. Honneth is 
thus able to make a stronger link than Habermas 
does between the normative presuppositions 
of social interaction and the moral feelings of 
those involved, thereby identifying important 
aspects of everyday experiences which are able 
to ground his critical standpoint whilst pointing 
towards concrete emancipatory possibilities. An 
emphasis on the violations of – often implicit – 
relations of intersubjective recognition at work 
in ‘structural forms of disrespect’, and on how 
these pose a serious threat to the identity and 
personal integrity of those most vulnerable, 
also allows for an account of the ways in which 
experiences of personal suffering (potentially) 
translate into struggles for expanded forms of 
social and political recognition.
Although Habermas’s theory still meets 
Horkheimer’s methodological criteria for a 
‘critical’ theory, his replacement of social labour 
with communicative understanding, rather 
than an exploration of their complex entwine-
ment, also leaves him with no replacement 
for the moral experiences of injustice faced by 
the proletariat. Honneth, on the other hand, 
importantly focuses on a conception of ‘the 
communicative organisation of material pro-
duction’, which he sees as the ‘productive part 
of the tradition of critical Marxism’ abandoned 
by Habermas. To his credit, however, Honneth 
does this without reinstating any simple prior-
ity of social class, and he avoids a reductionist 
economics or class-based analysis of social injus-
tice – not that the Critical Theory tradition was 
in any way a straightforward example of this. 
Instead, Honneth’s focus on relations of recog- 
nition ‘in the broadest sense’ is to be com-
mended for developing a critical-theoretical 
framework which explores the injuries of gender 
inequality, racial injustice, and homophobia, 
amongst others, in addition to class exploita-
tion, as well as the complicated ways in which 
these inequalities intersect, and the diverse 
nature of the struggles seeking to address them.
However, as we have also seen, there are a 
number of problems with the ways in which the 
notion of ‘recognition’ operates in Honneth’s 
work. His tendency to idealise and purify the 
notion of recognition neglects the difficulties 
and ambiguities of recognition, as well as our 
frequent investment in the disavowal of the 
other. Honneth lacks an adequate conception of 
misrecognition, and often misses the ideological 
misadventures of recognition: our failures in 
recognition and the phenomenological question 
of how we come to know the other and what we 
know about the other, the risk of affirming fixed 
identities rather than exploring transformative 
ones by perceiving of claims to recognition as 
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‘identity’ claims, and the ways in which ‘in- 
juries of recognition’ might require new forms 
of recognition which exceed established forms 
of justice. Despite his criticisms of Habermas, 
as well as his desire to bridge the gap between 
abstract rational principles and the (substan-
tive) norms of lifeworld practices, Honneth 
also reproduces similar strains of abstraction 
and proceduralism in his ‘formal’ conception 
of ethical life, and we are left with broad, social 
goals that are too formal to produce solidarity 
or motivate action, and which abstract from 
difference and particularity and lack a true sense 
of the ethical.
What these shortcomings leave us with, if 
we wish to pursue the original project of Crit- 
ical Theory under changed circumstances, and 
with a greater sensitivity to the importance of 
recognition, is the need to not only provide a 
more substantive conception of recognition and 
ethical responsibility, whilst remaining sensitive 
to the paradoxes and reversals of recognition, 
but also one which avoids the temptations of 
idealisation, normative universalism and proce-
dural accounts of freedom which we have dis-
covered in the work of Habermas and Honneth. 
A return to Adorno’s account of non-reified 
culture and ethics – as a response to the suf-
fering produced by commodification, identity 
thinking and technological rationality – is one 
promising alternative to the shortcomings in 
the work of Habermas and Honneth. Adorno’s 
commitment to non-identity and particularity, 
and his outline of an aesthetic praxis, might 
help us to identify a number of the ways in 
which we are often structurally encouraged to 
objectify – and misrecognise – others whilst dis-
avowing our own need for recognition. Despite 
Honneth’s criticisms of early Critical Theory 
outlined above, arguably Adorno provides us 
with a more sensitive – albeit more rarefied – 
account of recognition, ethical responsibility 
and solidarity, and his work is therefore a more 
promising critical-theoretical response to the 
instrumentality and atomism of our late capital-
ist acquisitive culture.58
I also find Jacques Rancière’s emphasis on 
the dis-identification with pre-determined 
identities instructive and promising here 
(Rancière 2016; 92). Rancière foregrounds 
the importance of ‘disagreement’ (mésentente – 
which plays on the relation and disjunction 
between ‘hearing’ and ‘understanding’) and 
its prevention of dialogue, preferring to see 
the political constitution of community in 
terms of division – and the constitution of 
the subject as indeterminate – rather than as 
presupposed in the (Habermasian) possibil-
ity of ideal agreement or the (Honnethian) 
possibility of reciprocal recognition (Rancière 
1999). Instead of a procedural account of how 
we might reach consensus or achieve recog-
nition and self-realisation, Rancière insists on 
the importance of questioning the political 
58 I pursue this line of thought in Hazeldine (2015) where I argue that the failings of the communica- 
tive turn (and Foucault’s alternative critical theory) immanently point us back towards the phi-
losophy and negative aesthetics of Adorno. There I particularly focus on Adorno’s commitment 
to non-identity and particularity, his notion of dialectical experience, his critique of the culture 
industry and related politics of representation, as well as his outline of an aesthetic praxis.
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constitution of community, its forms of com-
munication, and its constitution of political 
subjects. Ultimately, he sees Honneth’s focus 
on recognition as affirming the social order 
(of ‘policing’), and he is concerned that his 
theory of recognition presupposes and affirms 
already-existing identities and institutions, and 
forgets the importance of disagreement and 
dissensus, and the need for the indeterminate 
(and non-identical) to have a voice. Rancière’s 
political conclusions also make important links 
to aesthetics, a sphere largely missing from 
Habermasian and Honnethian versions of criti-
cal theory, and his conception of the police in 
terms of ‘the distribution of the sensible’ – as 
‘an order of the visible and the sayable that 
sees that a particular activity is visible and 
another is not, that this speech is understood 
as discourse and another as noise’ (Rancière 
1999; 29) – return us to some of Adorno’s 
insights regarding aesthetics and the ethics of 
non-identity. However, due to limitations of 
space here, what a reconfigured version of a 
recognitive Critical Theory might look like, 
one informed by the work of Rancière and a 
return to Adorno whilst also being able to meet 
the demanding criteria set out by the original 
Critical Theory project, and to incorporate the 
important interventions made by Honneth, 
will have to await future work.
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SANTRAUKA
SOCIALINIO pRIpAŽINIMO pATOLOGIJOS: AXELIS HONNETHAS IR KRITINĖS  
TEORIJOS ATSINAUJINIMO GALIMYBĖ
Straipsnyje kritiškai įvertinami Axelio Honnetho teoriniai darbai ir jo indėlis į šiuolaikinę kritinę teoriją, 
sociologinę analizę ir išsivadavimo politiką. Teksto pradžioje aptariamas Honnetho darbų santykis su pir-
mąja kritinės teorijos karta ir Jürgeno Habermaso komunikatyvaus veiksmo teorija. Vėliau pereinama prie 
Honnetho susidomėjimo ankstyvaisiais Hegelio darbais apie pripažinimą ir abipusio pripažinimo formas, 
kurios struktūruoja savivertės, savęs realizavimo, nepagarbos, moralinio vystymosi ir pasipriešinimo galimy-
bes. Analizuodamas moralinio vystymosi standartus, leidžiančius įvertinti visuomeninį pripažinimą ir sykiu 
kovoti dėl jo, Honnethas kuria „formaliąją etinio gyvenimo koncepciją“. Joje jis bando suderinti komunita-
rinę etiką ir formalią Kanto moralės filosofiją ir sykiu pagrindžia savo paties normatyvinę laikyseną. Pabai-
goje, trumpai pristačius Honnetho vėlyvuosius darbus apie sudaiktinimą ir pripažinimą, imamasi išsamios 
jo teorijos kritikos. Nors Honnetho pasiūlyta pripažinimo samprata išplečia kritinės teorijos perspektyvas, 
labiausiai kritikuotinas yra jo polinkis idealizuoti pripažinimo sąvoką, argumentuotos nepripažinimo kon-
cepcijos stoka, ideologinio pripažinimo vaidmens ignoravimas ir abstrakti bei procedūrinė „formalios etinio 
gyvenimo koncepcijos“ prigimtis.
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